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Abstract
On the Cryptographic Deniability of the Signal Protocol
by
Nihal Vatandas

Advisor: Professor Rosario Gennaro

Offline deniability is the ability to a posteriori deny having participated in a particular
communication session. This property has been widely assumed for the Signal messaging
application, yet no formal proof has appeared in the literature. In this work, we present the
first formal study of the offline deniability of the Signal protocol. Our analysis shows that
building a deniability proof for Signal is non-trivial and requires strong assumptions on the
underlying mathematical groups where the protocol is run.
To do so, we study various implicitly authenticated key exchange protocols, including
MQV, HMQV, and 3DH/X3DH, the latter being the core key agreement protocol in Signal.
We first present examples of mathematical groups where running MQV results in a provably
non-deniable interaction. While the concrete attack applies only to MQV, it also exemplifies
the problems in attempting to prove the deniability of other implicitly authenticated protocols, such as 3DH. In particular, it shows that the intuition that the minimal transcript
produced by these protocols suffices for ensuring deniability does not hold. We then provide
a characterization of the groups where deniability holds, defined in terms of a knowledge
assumption that extends the Knowledge of Exponent Assumption (KEA).
We conclude our research by presenting additional results. First, we prove a general
theorem that links the deniability of a communication session to the deniability of the key
agreement protocol starting the session. This allows us to extend our results on the deniability of 3DH/X3DH to the entire Signal communication session.

v
We show how our Knowledge of Diffie-Hellman Assumptions (KDH) knowledge assumption family can be used to establish a deniability proof for other implicitly authenticated
Diffie-Hellman protocols, specifically the OAKE family [80].
By examining the deniability of the implicitly authenticated AKE protocols augmented
with a confirmation step, we also demonstrate a counterintuitive result. Although such a
modification requires protocol users to exchange additional information during the session,
deniability may be established for these protocols under weaker assumptions (compared to
the implicitly authenticated version).
Lastly, we discussed our observations on various attack scenarios that undermine offline
deniability with the assistance of third-party services and why these attacks should be put
in a different category than offline deniability.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Deniable Communications

In digital communications, we authenticate ourselves to other parties, usually through the
use of a secret key that is linked to our identity. Depending on the application, this could
be a public/private key pair such as a signature key, an encryption key, or it could be a
pre-shared symmetric key confirming our identity to our interlocutor.
Cryptographic deniability refers to the ability to deny our involvement in a particular
communication session. This is accomplished not by obscuring our digital presence, which
exists as a result of our usage of identity keys, but rather by rendering our presence ineligible
for use as proof of our participation in a particular communication session. This is usually
possible by designing protocols in such a way that potential evidence of our interaction might
be easily fabricated as well from the information available to others.
Informally, deniable communications ensure that two parties communicating online will
be unable to prove to a third party that any communication actually happened. The source of
threat against the deniability of a user could be an outsider eavesdropping on the conversation
as well as the user’s peer in the communication. Deniability should be maintained in the
1
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latter case, too, even if one of the peers violates the protocol’s instructions in order to
generate a proof associated with the other party’s identity.
Given the fact that the source of threat to our deniability could be our peer, to whom
we are authenticating, the concept of deniability may appear as a conflicting term. After
all, the protocol is set to prove our identity, while the generated output cannot be linked to
our identity. Indeed, a deniable protocol assures a user Alice that she is speaking with Bob
(Bob authenticates), but this assurance should be unique to Alice and not “transferable” to
a third party. Thus Bob’s messages should not be convincing to anyone other than Alice.

1

A key observation is that communications authenticated via a shared symmetric key are
intrinsically deniable: any authenticated message held by one of the parties could have been
produced by either party (since they both know the key) and therefore is not a proof of the
origin of the message. In other words, when Alice receives a message authenticated by Bob,
she knows it comes from Bob because she did not send it, and only Alice and Bob know the
authentication key. On the other hand, a third party will not be able to distinguish if the
message was authenticated by Alice or Bob.
Deniable authentication is based on a similar concept in the asymmetric public key
setting. Authenticated messages might have been produced by either side and are therefore
useless as proof for a third party to implicate a specific participant.

1

The assurance that cryptographic deniability offers lies at the algorithmic level, i.e., a
deniable protocol does not generate any output that may be used to incriminate the user.
Traffic analysis of digital communications may lead to IP to be tracked down to the origin
of a message. A deniable authentication running at the IP layer (with the necessary caution
paid to the upper layer protocols), for example, prohibits the device’s IP address from being
associated with the user’s identity, i.e. the user’s secret key.
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Offline vs Online Deniability

The definition of deniability considers a judge whose role is to assess if the presented evidence
for a protocol session allegedly between Alice and Bob corresponds to an actual execution
of the protocol, or if it is possibly a fabricated “evidence.” Different types of deniability
for a protocol are conceivable depending on the judge’s intervention to the communication
session.
Consider a scenario where Bob is trying to prove to the judge that he is talking to Alice.
Offline deniability involves a judge who is not present during the communication. Instead,
the judge attempts to decide whether Alice engaged in a communication with Bob, upon
reading evidence presented by Bob after the session ends. Alternatively, we can consider a
judge who participates in the protocol and actively collaborates with Bob during the run of
the protocol. In this case, the judge can pick some protocol values on behalf of Bob, which
will eventually convince the judge that Bob is receiving information authenticated by Alice.
A protocol is online deniable if such a collusion between Bob and the judge is possible while
still keeping Bob’s identity secret key hidden from the judge. Note that, otherwise, it would
be impossible to distinguish between Bob and the judge and therefore deniability would be
irrelevant.
Obviously, online deniability is a stronger notion, and indeed not easy to achieve [78, 75,
31]. Notice that an online judge that is able to obtain proof of communication during the run
of a protocol may be unable to convince anyone else either, as the “proof” that is convincing
for the judge may be nontransferable. That is, a protocol which fails to satisfy online
deniability may leave convincing evidence for merely an online colluding party available at
the time of protocol run, but it may still be hard to convince anyone else by that “onetime proof” after the communication ends. On the other hand, failure to maintain offline
deniability may leave traces that convince everyone (possibly with the assistance of Bob)
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after the communication ends. Therefore maintaining offline deniability is of more practical
relevance.

1.3

Deniable Authenticated Key Exchange

Communication sessions are usually split in an online authenticated key exchange (AKE)
protocol, used by the parties to authenticate each other using their own private/public
keys and establish a secret session key. This is followed by a communication session which
is protected (authenticated and possibly encrypted) usually by means of symmetric-key
techniques using the session key established by the AKE. To ensure the session’s deniability,
it is always necessary that the session key generated by AKE can be “denied” by either party
(deniable authenticated key exchange).
Additionally, the deniability of the AKE alone may be sufficient to assure the deniability
of the entire session, depending how message authentication is handled in the communication
session that follows the AKE. In case the messages are authenticated using a symmetric-key
approach that is deniable (since not linked to the peers’ identities), the AKE protocol will
be the sole focus of attention for deniability.
There are two parties to an authenticated key exchange protocol, Alice and Bob, associated with identity keys (skA , pkA ) and (skB , pkB ), respectively. The parties run according to
the specified protocol, one acting as the initiator and the other as responder and eventually
the protocol returns a shared session key K to each user. By the end of a successful execution of the protocol, Alice makes sure that she is talking with Bob, who holds the secret key
associated to pkB , and that Bob is the only other party who can compute the session key
K. Similarly Bob has the same assurance.
When Alice and Bob communicate through a deniable AKE, the protocol is supposed to
establish a shared secret between two as above, this time without leaving any cryptographic
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evidence of communication that can convince a third party. That is, by the end of the
protocol Alice is convinced that she is talking with Bob and she cannot prove to anyone else
that she communicated with Bob. Also, Alice is guaranteed that Bob, even he is malicious,
cannot prove to anyone else that a communication took place.
Deniability for an AKE protocol must be investigated independently for each party, i.e.,
for the initiator and responder. A protocol may be deniable with respect to only one of these
parties. Say, the initiator Alice (or the responder Bob) might be able to deny the session
with Bob (resp. Alice), whereas Bob does not have this guarantee. In that case, the protocol
is said to be deniable with respect to initiator (resp. responder). When deniability assurance
holds with respect to each parties, the protocol is said to be a deniable key exchange protocol.
Deniable key exchange is formally defined in [28] based on the simulation paradigm.
Informally, the definition says that an AKE protocol is (offline) deniable with respect to
Alice if the view of Bob can be simulated by an efficient simulator that does not possess
Alice’s identity secret key and is allowed to interact with Bob to create the simulation. A
successful simulation is the one which cannot be distinguished from the real view of Bob by
any efficient distinguisher (judge). Bob’s view includes both the protocol’s transcript and
the associated session key.
The definition is comparable to that of standard zero-knowledge. Similarly, we can
interpret this statement to mean that Bob’s view does not convey significantly more information to a judge/distinguisher than a simulation produced without Alice’s identity secret
key. Therefore, Bob’s view cannot be used to incriminate Alice, since any information Bob
presents to the judge could have been produced by the simulator as well.
The fact that a participant’s view includes the session key K implies that deniability of
AKE may easily extend to the communication session secured by AKE regardless of how
the communication protocol uses K. Common practice is to derive hash or encryption keys
from K and employ symmetric-key methods to secure the communication phase. A deniable
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session key K ensures deniability of the subsequent operations as long as the identity keys
of participants are not involved in the subsequent computations. (See Section 3.3 for further
discussion.)
Involving the session key in the view is a critical point and some misconceptions on this
point are present in the literature [74, 75]. Evaluating an AKE’s deniability solely on the
basis of its transcript simulatability may indeed result in inaccurate findings. This approach
is consistent with the definition of “deniable authentication protocol” rather than “deniable
key exchange.”
Simulating only the transcript suggests that the transcript is devoid of any confirmation
of the participants’ identity, allowing the transcript to be denied. However, the ability to
compute K could be a sign of participation in the protocol, too. One might assume that
since the ability to compute the session key is symmetric, it cannot be used to incriminate
a protocol participant. This viewpoint, however, is incorrect. In Section 1.6, we will look at
how implicitly authenticated key exchange protocols allow a party to renounce this ability by
executing the protocol dishonestly. Only one party will be capable of computing the session
key K in this case, which may work against that party’s deniability.

1.4

Restrictions for Deniability Simulation

The idea behind the deniability definition is that because the outputs of a deniable protocol
can be generated using a simulator, the outputs of a claimed protocol execution should not be
regarded as proof that the protocol was actually performed. In this respect, the simulation
is a method of producing “false evidence” to claim the occurrence of a session, rendering the
actual protocol outputs ineffective as proof. As a result, the simulation must be executable
in the real world.
The fact that deniability simulation must happen in the real world leaves the deniability
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simulator devoid of some common tools used in simulation-based proofs. This condition
specifically relates to updating publicly visible values that are also accessible to third parties
(i.e., distinguishers). Some instances of this situation include programming random oracles
in RO model, or selecting common reference string–possibly combined with a trapdoor–in
CRS model. Because a RO function or a CRS value is fixed in reality, simulations involving
their modification are not applicable.
Another aspect to consider is about rewinding. The rewinding technique is known to
cause complications with efficiently completing the ZK simulations in concurrent execution
settings. The same concern applies for concurrent executions of deniable protocols, too.
Additionally, [33, 78] raised issues about the use of rewinding in deniability simulations. The
key problem is that a deniability attacker could produce its messages using a third-party
service during the protocol session. When the adversary is rewound, it may be required to
rewind the third-party as well in order to maintain desired control over the adversary.
Furthermore, Walfish [78] described an attack strategy based on the exploitation of online third-party services. The attack is intended to demonstrate that protocols requiring
rewinding in deniability simulations are inherently non-deniable. Briefly, Walfish’s argument appears to be relevant to online deniability, rather than offline deniability. We address
this issue in greater detail in Chapter 2.

1.5

Implicitly Authenticated Key Exchange

Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol is usually combined with authentication of communicating parties in order to thwart active adversary attacks. Authentication is usually
carried out by use of cryptographic primitives, such as signatures, encryption, MAC or hash
functions.
A well-known practice in key agreement is for parties to exchange the necessary DH
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Implicitly Authenticated Diffie-Hellman
Alice
(a, A = g a )

Bob
(b, B = g b )
X = gx
-

Y = gy


K = KDF (A, B, X, Y, a, b, x, y)

Figure 1.1: A generic representation of implicitly authenticated DH protocols with session
key K
components and authentication values, followed by a hash (or MAC) of the transcript at the
final stage to ensure that their peer is able to compute the right session key as well. This
practice is referred to as key confirmation.
A design choice motivated by increasing the efficiency in practice is to defer the confirmation step to the communication session that follows the key agreement phase. That is,
after exchanging the values required to compute the session key, each party computes the
session key K and prepares to use it to secure the upcoming communication phase, such as
generating an encryption key. Once Bob sends a message encrypted by the key derived from
K, Alice knows that Bob correctly computed the session key K. Authentication takes place
implicitly since Alice knows that the only person who is able to compute the session key
beside herself, is Bob. This convinces Alice that the message is coming from Bob and also
Bob computed the key correctly. This line of design of KE protocols in which authentication
comes from the ability to compute the key is called implicitly authenticated key exchange
(iAKE).
Implicitly authenticated DH protocols have gained widespread adoption due to their
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efficiency in communication cost, which is identical to that of plain (unauthenticated) DH
protocol. This type of protocols are extremely simple, as they do not need encryption or a
MAC value for authentication purposes. Each user exchanges only a DH component in the
protocol message, which is a randomly generated value often used as an ephemeral public
key. See examples in Figure 1.1. Due to the absence of any value associated with the users’
identities in the protocol transcript, these protocols “appear” convincingly deniable.
Implicit authentication, on the other hand, may result in incrimination that is harder
to identify at first glance. A party’s ability to compute the session key can be used to
incriminate them as well, since authentication relies on this ability. Though this ability is
symmetric (both Alice and Bob can compute K), it can be used to incriminate one side
through a dishonest twist by the other party. The lack of key confirmation may allow such
a dishonest act to go unnoticed from the attention of the victim.
Alice, for example, might choose her ephemeral key pair (x, X = g x ) in such a way that
she can prove she doesn’t know the secret associated with her ephemeral public key X.
Setting the public key X to hash of some value will be strong enough evidence for Alice to
convince a judge that she doesn’t know her ephemeral secret x = log X. In this situation,
Alice deliberately gave up the ability to compute the session key K, and the ability now
resides entirely (and uniquely) with Bob. Once Bob sends a message using K, Alice may
bring it to the judge as evidence that the message is originated with Bob, as Bob is the only
one who can compute K. Obviously, Alice must also demonstrate to the judge that K is
the real session key associated with their key exchange transcript in order to establish such
a claim (K must be recognizable by the judge).
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Obtaining Incriminating Evidence from AKE Protocols

Incrimination refers to the act of one party to a communication session acting intentionally
(and sometimes dishonestly) and demonstrating that its peer has participated in the protocol.
Incrimination may occur when a party provides publishable evidence of their participation,
such as a signature from Alice, which immediately demonstrating her identity. Alternatively,
the evidence may be acquired by demonstrating that Alice performed a computation. In
general, we can describe an incriminating evidence as an information obtained from Alice
that cannot be simulated without Alice’s identity secret key.
Let us walk through the examples of various AKE protocols, to understand how an
(incriminating) evidence of involvement can be gained from a participant to a protocol,
which may not always be immediately apparent. In all of the scenarios, we are assuming the
presence of an offline judge.
Example 1.6.1 (ISO-9796). Figure 1.2 shows ISO-9796, a Diffie-Hellman protocol authenticated by signature. Alice and Bob use their signature key pairs as their long-term (identity)
keys. Each party provides an ephemeral DH component (X and Y ), followed by a signature of both ephemeral keys and the identity of their respective peer. This is an example
of a non-deniable AKE because the signatures connect the identities of the communicating
parties, providing publicly verifiable evidence that Alice and Bob ran (or attempted to run)
a session. Any eavesdropper can gather evidence for this session run without the need for
Alice or Bob’s assistance.

Example 1.6.2 (SIGMA-I). On the other hand, the adoption of signatures does not
completely eliminate the possibility of deniability. A communication session may allow
participants to sign session values other than their peers’ identities while yet maintaining a
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ISO-9796
Alice
(skA , pkA )

Bob
(skB , pkB )
Â, g x
-

B̂, g y , SigskB (g x , g y , Â)


SigskA (g y , g x , B̂)
-

K = Hash(Â, B̂, X, Y, g xy )

Figure 1.2: ISO-9796 Protocol with session key K
limited degree of deniability on their part.
See Figure 1.3, the SIGMA-I protocol [51], for an illustration of this approach. The
protocol uses both signatures and MACs for authentication. Notice that neither party signs
any value tied to the identity of the other party. In this example, Bob’s signature in the
protocol communication indicates that Bob was alive and had run the protocol, even though
there is no evidence of the receiver’s identity. This gives Bob the ability to deny both the
receiver and the content of communications protected under the resulting session key.
The level of deniability that SIGMA-I provides for Bob falls under the category of partial
deniability[28]. This is a weaker definition and on the technical side it differs from the
original definition in that the simulator is permitted to have an additional oracle access with
the simulated party. Specifically, the simulator is given access to an oracle that keeps Alice’s
secret key and performs the protocol honestly in either initiator or responder role (when
deniability for Alice is evaluated). The inclusion of the signatures in the simulation is made
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possible thanks to the integration of this extra oracle.
SIGMA-I
Alice
(skA , pkA )

Bob
(skB , pkB )
Â, g x
y

B̂, g , σB , tB


(Km , Ks ) = KDF (g xy )
σA = SigskA (g y , g x )
tA = M ACKm (0, A)

(Km , Ks ) = KDF (g xy )
σB = SigskB (g y , g x )
tB = M ACKm (1, B)

σA , tA
-

K = Ks

Figure 1.3: SIGMA-I protocol with session key K
SIGMA-I fulfills partial deniability only for Bob, the responder. Additionally, there is a
four-round variant of SIGMA (named SIGMA-R) which is partially deniable for both parties.
We will examine the three-round variant, SIGMA-I, in order to illustrate how the partial
deniability fails for the initiator, which is not quite easy to see.
SIGMA-I is not deniable for Alice, the initiator. This fact manifests itself in the following
ways in simulation and in practice, respectively.
In the simulation setting, the additional oracle of Alice can be used in either role (initiator
or responder), since signatures in SIGMA-I includes no indicator of the role of the signer.
However, oracle in neither role is sufficient for obtaining signatures on the correct values.
When Alice’s oracle acts as the responder, we recognize that an initial commit from Alice to
her ephemeral key is necessary.2 When the oracle assumes the responder role, SIM is unable
2

Satisfying this criterion leads in the four-round version, SIGMA-R, that is partially
deniable for both parties.
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to compute the MAC required to retrieve Alice’s signature.
In practice, this situation leads to an incriminating strategy as follows. Bob, the malicious
responder, may select g y based on g x that he received from Alice. This causes the signatures
to reflect the role of the signer: Even though Alice only signs some random looking values
(g y , g x ), the connection between the values and their order reveals that SigskA (g y , g x ) is
created by the initiator.
The core mechanism enabling partial deniability in SIGMA is the flexibility to substitute an initiator’s signature for the responder’s signature (or vice versa). However, with
Bob’s strategy outlined above, this feature is removed, hence compromising the initiator’s
deniability.
Notice that such a strategy only damages initiator’s deniability, since the responder in
the protocol signs any value g x received from the initiator without knowing the identity of
the initiator. On the other side, the initiator signs the value g y after the responder’s identity
is verified. As a result of Bob’s strategy, Alice lost the chance to pretend that she acted as
responder and signed without knowing who she was talking to.
This is an interesting example that demonstrates how a malicious party might exploit
use of a random value by encoding information in it. We will see that the threat to Signal’s
deniability is caused by a similar strategy by the attacker.

Example 1.6.3 (SKEME). SKEME [50], seen in Figure 1.4, is another Diffie-Hellman
based protocol, where authentication is carried out by encryption and MAC.
In contrast to the earlier examples, SKEME’s transcript only contains the types of messages that both participants can compute. This is insufficient by itself to prove deniability
in the strong form of [28]. However, based on this characteristic, we can conclude that the
protocol is deniable when both parties act honestly. Due to the fact that both parties are
capable of producing any message that could be used as evidence, one party cannot frame
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SKEME
Alice
(skA , pkA )

Bob
(skB , pkB )

x, kA at random
cA = enc(pkB , kA )

cA , g x
-

y, kB at random
kA0 = dec(skB , cA )
tB = M ACkA0 (g y , g x )
cB = enc(pkA , kB )

y

cB , g , tB

?

tB = M ACkA (g y , g x )
0
kB
= dec(skA , cB )
tA = M ACkB0 (g x , g y )

tA

?

-

tA = M ACkB (g x , g y )

K = P RFkA (g xy ) ⊕ P RFkB (g xy )

Figure 1.4: SKEME protocol with session key K
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the other.
SKEME’s security is reliant on the CCA2 security of the encryption used in its construction, even though CCA2 does not suffice to provide deniability protection by itself.
Specifically, SKEME is deniable against malicious players when the encryption scheme is
chosen to be “plaintext-aware” (PA2)[28].
DiRaimondo et. al. [28] demonstrates how to obtain incriminating evidence from SKEME
using a CCA2 encryption.
The encryption scheme they use is specifically tailored for the counterexample, but it
highlights a surprising aspect of CCA2 security. Their encryption scheme makes use of an
unusual type of public key pair. To encrypt a message m, one merely requires the first half of
the public key and uses it to do standard encryption. Similarly for decryption, only first half
of the secret key is necessary to decrypt. However the decryption algorithm may optionally
deliver the secret information (which is part of the secret key) associated with the unused
fraction of the public key. This option can be triggered by anyone doing a simple bit flip
on the ciphertext, so it is fairly simple to activate. Enabling this feature allows a party to
obtain unsimulatable information from the decryptor indicating that the encrypted message
m is the output of the decryption algorithm, and hence was generated by the party holding
the decryption (secret) key.
Due to the fact that the additional secret embedded in the public key does not compromise
the confidentiality of the message m, the encryption scheme preserves its CCA2 security. On
the other hand, it is surprising to discover that a proof of running the decryption algorithm
without violating the security conditions is possible. This hard-to-see gap was closed by the
plaintext awareness property, which prohibits the ciphertext from being modified in such a
way that it decrypts to a message initially unknown to the encryptor.
Example 1.6.4 (iAKE Protocols). The transcript of DH-based iAKE protocols are made
as minimal as possible; each party sends one DH component only (see Figure 1.1). In the
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absence of additional cryptographic primitives such as encryption, MACs, or hashes, the
protocol appears to be unproblematic from the deniability aspect: Nothing in the communications conveys information about the participants’ identity, and so such protocols must
be deniable.
This perception is challenged when faced with the formal definition of deniable AKE.
According to the definition, the session key must be simulated as well as the transcript, yet
given the simulator’s state of knowledge, this may be impossible (depending on the specified
key computation).
When simulation is impossible (and the definition is precise), we expect this scenario to
manifest itself in practice as an attack strategy. For such an incriminating attack, a potential
source of threat with iAKE protocols may be an adversary exploiting the random value’s
use, as with the SIGMA-I example above. Unlike in the previous example, the adversary
will not encode specific information into the random value, but will instead exploit it to
demonstrate his lack of knowledge.
The threat scenario follows from the fact that in case of iAKE protocols, the authentication comes from parties to have the ability to compute the session key. This ability resides
only on the two communicating parties Alice and Bob. When one of the parties acts dishonestly and purposefully abdicates this ability, the circumstance may become incriminating for
the other party.
Let us continue the discussion with 3DH, the predecessor and synchronous version of
Signal’s X3DH protocol. The reason for choosing 3DH is to keep the example simple by
removing the complexity of involving the server. Note that the discussion also applies with
minor changes to other iAKE protocols we addressed.
The session key of 3DH is K = H(g ay ||g xy ||g bx ), double bars indicating the concatenation.
The main authentication mechanism of 3DH is to derive keys from Y a and X b .
Assume that an adversary, Bob, receives X = g x from Alice, who is willing to start a
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conversation. Let Bob choose his ephemeral key Y as the hash of some value, such as a
fragment from daily newspaper NYT: Y = H(N Y T ). After receiving Y from Bob, Alice
computes the session key K, encrypts some message with it and sends the ciphertext to Bob.
Notice that Bob may take the ciphertext and claim to the judge that the encrypted
message originated with Alice. Bob tells the judge that “This is the encryption key K, which
I am unable to calculate. This message originated from Alice, who is the only one capable
of computing this key.” Y and N Y T serve as evidence that he does not know y = log Y and
is incapable of computing the key K.
There are a few points to be noted here. First, for Bob’s claim to have any convincing
value, the judge must recognize the session key, i.e., recognize that K corresponds to the
session with public keys A, B, X, Y . When analyzing the initiator’s deniability in 3DH, the
bottleneck is g ay in the key computation. If g ay is recognizable then the judge may make
Alice disclose x = log X so that K become recognizable. Second, we addressed in Section
3.4 that, there are group settings where it is possible that Bob is unable to compute yet
capable of recognizing g ay value. In that case the judge may not even need to know Alice’s
ephemeral secret x. Thirdly, unlike the previous examples, this attack is distinguished by
the fact that deniability is affected by the algebraic properties of the underlying group.
In Section 3.4, we addressed a group setting in which MQV is provably non-deniable,
yet the analysis remains inconclusive in a different group setting without an additional
assumption or tool.
As we discussed throughout this work, there is a gap in the protocol settings, that enables
such an incriminating method to be used. In other words, neither the specifications of the
key derivation functions nor the algebraic group properties of the protocols we studied in this
work makes such an attack impossible. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, no well-known
attribute of the hashes or groups is sufficient in and of itself to rule out the threat posed by
this attack. Our approach is to describe this gap in terms of the hash and group structure
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jointly.
In Section 3.5, we have identified the characteristics of the hash (used in the key computation) and the algebraic groups (for Diffie-Hellman operation) that enable such an attack
to produce incriminating evidence against a protocol user. We then prove that this attack
is the only barrier to the deniability for the iAKE protocols we examined. Following that
we concluded that these iAKE protocols are resistant to this attack, and therefore deniable,
provided that such characteristics do not exist in their configuration (i.e., in their choice of
group and hash functions).

1.7

The Signal Communication Protocol

Signal protocol is running on a key exchange followed by a double ratcheting mechanism,
which regularly injects fresh entropy to the keys to ensure forward secrecy. In Section 3.3,
we showed that having a deniable KE is sufficient to claim deniability of the entire session
that follows it.
Deniability was one of the main goals in the design of the Signal protocol [20], which has
become the de-facto standard in the area of secure messaging protocols (it is now widely
deployed including in protocols such as WhatsApp and Facebook messenger). Yet a formal
proof of its deniability property has been lacking.
In fact, in [75, 74] it has already been shown that online deniability does not hold for
Signal. On the other hand its offline deniability is widely believed to hold.
In this study, we address the reasons why a proof for the offline deniability of Signal
has been difficult to construct and analyze ways to overcome this problem, offering the first
formal study of the offline deniability of the Signal protocol.
For this, we focus on the offline deniability properties of a particular family of AKE
protocols, namely, implicitly authenticated protocols (which, in particular, form the basis of
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Signal, see below). These are characterized by the property that the transcript of the protocol
is independent of the private keys of the peers. That is, anyone can generate the transcript
messages. Authentication is provided implicitly by involving the peers’ private keys in the
derivation of the session key. Implicitly authenticated protocols seem to be perfectly suited
to provide deniability. In their minimal form, all the peers exchange are Diffie-Hellman (DH)
values X = g x , Y = g y with the key being computed as a function of X, Y , the public keys
of the parties and their corresponding private keys. There is little one can learn about the
participants from these transcripts, hence, intuitively, they “must be deniable.”
The above intuition, however, has been insufficient to prove these protocols deniable, in
particular due to the need to simulate the session key. Thus, the question of deniability
of implicitly authenticated protocols has not been settled to this day. This is not just a
challenging theoretical question, but one of practical significance. Indeed, prime examples of
this family are MQV [59, 54], HMQV [52], and 3DH [56] (see Section 3.1 for the description
of these protocols). Implicitly authenticated protocols are particularly attractive due to their
higher efficiency (since no additional signatures or encryptions are computed/sent together
with the basic DH ephemeral keys). Very importantly, 3DH is the basis of the X3DH AKE
underlying the Signal protocol and a main source of “intuition” regarding Signal’s deniability
properties.

1.8

Our Contribution

We make progress in the study of deniability of implicitly authenticated key exchange protocols, and Signal, in several ways:
• We demonstrate the insufficiency of implicit authentication as a property to ensure deniability. We present settings, in terms of properties of groups and assumptions, where the
original MQV protocol [59] (that does not use a random oracle for key derivation) fails denia-
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bility. We discuss how the counter-example built around MQV illuminates the difficulties one
encounters in attempting to prove deniability for any of the other implicitly authenticated
AKEs we consider, including 3DH.
• Using the above result, we are able to characterize the non-deniability of MQV in terms
of the feasibility of the following problem: Given a random group element A, sample Y
in G (with any efficiently-samplable distribution), so that it is hard to compute the DiffieHellman value of A and Y , denoted DH(A, Y ), even for the party sampling Y while it is easy
(for anyone) to decide correctness of DH(A, Y ). We show that if such a Y can be feasibly
sampled in G, then MQV is non-deniable over G and an adversary can always prove that he
communicated with a particular honest peer.
• We show that in groups where the above condition does not hold (namely, there are
efficient ways to sample Y , given A, so that it is infeasible to compute and decide DH(A, Y )),
deniability holds for the studied protocols. Formally, we state a property, referred to as the
Knowledge of Diffie-Hellman (KDH) assumption, so that HMQV (or MQV with randomoracle key derivation) and 3DH are deniable in groups where this assumption holds. While
KDH is a strong assumption in the tradition of other knowledge assumptions, our treatment
shows it to be necessary for formally proving deniability of these protocols.
• We show a connection between KDH and the more established Knowledge of Exponent assumption (KEA) [22, 5] via an additional, but more natural assumption we call Knowledge of
Discrete Logarithm (KDL). In particular, we get that deniability of the above protocols holds
in groups where both KEA and KDL hold. It is an interesting question to find additional
properties that imply KDH, hence implying deniability of the above protocols.
• To validate the definition of deniable AKE we prove a general theorem showing that any
two-party protocol, whose transcript can be generated from a shared symmetric key and
public information, is deniable (namely, simulatable without access to the shared key) if the
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symmetric key is the product of a deniable AKE.
• As a corollary of the above theorem, we get a proof of deniability of the full Signal protocol
under the assumption that its underlying AKE, 3DH, is deniable; in particular, this is the
case under the KDH assumption.
• We analysed deniability of the protocols studied here when augmented with explicit
authentication. We showed that HMQV-C (HMQV with confirmation) is deniable with
respect to the initiator is achievable under the assumption KEA, which is weaker than the
KDH assumption that is required for the plain HMQV.
• We examined the deniability properties of OAKE protocols by Yao et. al. [80], a family
of implicitly authenticated Diffie-Hellman KE. We proved that without registration of longterm keys, the OAKE protocol is deniable under KDH, and T-OAKE is deniable under
EKDH assumption.

1.9

Organization

In Chapter 2 we presented related work in the literature. In Section 3.1 we introduce some
preliminaries, including the implicitly-authenticated key exchange protocols MQV, HMQV
and 3DH. In Section 3.2 we present the definition of Deniable Authenticate Key Exchange
and in Section 3.3 we prove how this notion extends to the deniability of communication
sessions that use a key computed through a deniable AKE. In Section 3.4 we show an important negative result: A group setting where the MQV protocol is provably non-deniable, in
particular showing that the intuition that implicitly authenticated protocols must be deniable does not hold. In Section 3.5 we use the MQV example from previous section to derive
a general characterization of non-deniability. In Section 3.6 we present our main results
regarding the provable deniability of the protocols we study, in particular introducing the
KDH assumption that underlies these results. In Section 3.7 we show that the deniability of
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3DH implies the deniability of X3DH and the full Signal protocol. In Section 3.8 we show
how to remove the assumption of proof of possession at key registration that was used in
some of the results in the paper. In Section 3.9 we present the KDL assumption and prove
that together with KEA it implies KDH, hence basing our deniability results on these assumptions too. In Section 4.1 we present deniability analysis of OAKE protocol family due
to [80] based on the KDH assumptions. In Section 4.2 we examine deniability properties
of the iAKE protocol combined with a key confirmation step. In Section 4.3 we present
attack scenarios demonstrating the impact of obfuscation and time-based cryptography on
deniability. Finally, in Chapter 5 we conclude with the future research directions on the
subject.

Chapter 2
Deniable Key Exchange in the
Literature
Deniability as a privacy notion has been studied since the 1990s, with the phrase referred to
also as ’plausible deniability’ in the early works. Initial research concentrated on the concept
of ’deniable authentication’ and its application to authentication protocols. Dwork et al. [33]
provided the first formal definition of deniable authentication, and among the early studies
on the subject are [32, 49, 40].
Offline deniable key exchange was defined in [28] based on the work on deniable authentication in [33]. Definitions of deniable AKE that offer composability and online deniability
were presented in [31, 78].
Informal discussions on deniable key exchange began to appear in [49, 12, 55, 13, 11,
26, 54], in which exploration of the concept is insightful and instructive in identifying the
various degrees of deniability that KE protocols might achieve.
Borisov et al. [11] presented a prominent work whose major objective is to provide
deniability and forward secrecy for instant messaging protocols. They developed a key
exchange protocol based on Diffie-Hellman to enable Off-the-Record communication, hence
23
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the name OTR protocol. As an instant messaging protocol, OTR begins with a synchronous
key agreement protocol, in which the parties are required to be online during the process.
It then moves on to a communication phase in which encrypted messages from two parties
are exchanged. OTR authentication is based on two factors. Users hold identity (long-term)
public keys and authenticate one another using signatures during the key agreement step.
Messages are authenticated in the communication that follows the AKE using regularly
refreshed MAC tags. OTR establishes deniability via two key mechanisms: signing randomlooking values that are independent of the peer’s identity during the key agreement phase
and exposing the keys for timed-out MAC values during the communication session As
explained in Section 3.3, disclosing MAC keys is not necessary for deniability if the prior
AKE is deniable and the subsequent communication session does not involve identity of
the communicating parties. Due to the inclusion of signatures in the transcript, OTR aims
for at most partial deniability. The protocol contains significant security flaws, which were
highlighted in [26] with suggested fixes (However, proposed fixes entailed a loss of deniability).
Despite its weaknesses, OTR made a significant contribution to bringing deniability to the
forefront of privacy concerns.
DiRaimondo et al. [28] introduced a formal definition of deniable key exchange based on
the simulation paradigm, extending the definition of deniable authentication by [33]. This
is the primary definition upon which we base our assessment of the offline deniability of
KE protocols in this work. The authors presented formalized the partial deniability for KE,
too, where the simulator is equipped with an additional oracle access. In order to evaluate
partial deniability for Alice against Bob, the simulator can interact with Alice but in this
interaction, the simulator must use a public key different than Bob’s public key. In this
way, Alice’s interactions with other parties in the network can be shown to be useful for
fabricating evidence of interaction with Bob. Obviously, such a strengthening is necessary
for the simulator in order to provide the signatures in the simulation. Additionally, it retains
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a useful privacy feature, as it does not reveal the identity of the interlocutor.
Yao et. al. presented a series of studies on key exchange protocols [79, 80, 82, 81],
where deniability was one of the desired characteristics, along with efficiency as the major
objective. As part of these studies, a new family of implicitly authenticated KE protocols,
named OAKE family, were introduced.
The authors examined the deniability properties of OAKE family in terms of honest
player (HP-) deniability, a new deniability definition for KE, introduced by the authors [80].
HP-deniability is weaker than the standard deniable key exchange definition by [28] and it
considers a basic form of deniability, namely that if both peers are honest during the protocol
run, they leave no trace of the communication. This notion considers the source of threat
as an outsider, such as an eavesdropper on a session run or an active adversary conducting
a man-in-the-middle attack to gather evidence that a session between two honest parties
occurred.
A protocol failing to fulfil this level of deniability allows an outsider to obtain an (incriminating) evidence that A and/or B ran the protocol even when A and B acted honestly.
According to HP-deniability, the view (of the adversary) to be simulated is composed
of the transcript, the session key and “all the pre-computed and stored session states” that
the adversary can acquire using state-reveal and session-reveal queries [80]. As a result,
the simulator of HP-deniability is able to compute easily any session value and the session
key derived from ephemeral secrets x and y. In that respect, 3DH and X3DH satisfy the
HP-deniability requirement, however MQV and HMQV do not due to the g ab factor in the
session key.
The evaluation of the OAKE family based on the standard offline deniability definition
was an open problem. In Section 4.1, we provided an analysis of OAKE protocols on the
basis of KDH assumptions.
Similar to HP-deniability, there are alternative, relaxed definitions of deniability that
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work for less expansive purposes [35, 21]. These definitions are tailored to offer deniability
for a particular type of information, for example, the protocol does not leave a provable trace
for the content of a conversation while it allows to prove that a communication between A
and B took place. Similar variations are available to deny source/destination of a conversation, the time of the protocol execution, the identity of the peer, and so forth. Typically,
these relaxations grant the simulator access to some appropriately defined oracles, where
the oracle represents the “deniability loss” with respect to the standard strict definition of
simulatability.
Other tools to achieve deniability include designated verifier proofs [44] and ring signatures [60, 66]. However these primitives do not provide deniability in the strong sense because
they incriminate both participants collectively. Designated verifier proofs refers to a proof
that only one party can verify, ensuring that this proof cannot be passed on to anyone else.
This property is achieved by use of an OR proof in [44]. For example, Alice proves to Bob
that she knows a certain value x by proving the statement “either I know x or Bob knows
his secret key.” Such a proof is non-transferable, but it leaves an evidence that Alice and
Bob were involved in the relevant protocol. Likewise, the ring signatures enable members of
a group to sign a message without it being tracked back to the original signer. Again, the
usage of a sign will incriminate both Alice and Bob, although no party should be according
to the standard deniability definition.
Pass [61] stresses the differences between a deniability simulator and a zero-knowledge
one (as defined in [37]). This work is significant for pointing out the conditions that should be
avoided in deniability simulations, owing to the requirement that simulations be executable
in real life. Pass showed that there are cases where ZK implies deniability in the standard
model. However, once stepping out of the standard model, this implication is not guaranteed
anymore, i.e., in CRS or ROM models. The meaning of a simulation created relying on the
additional abilities granted by CRS or ROM is unclear in terms of deniability, since the
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simulation is supposed to be a way of ’fabricating an evidence’ under the conditions where
a real protocol session is run. Therefore one should not use the simulation techniques such
as programming a random oracle or choosing its own CRS value for deniability analyses.
Rewinding is another simulation technique that should be used with caution in deniabilityrelated scenarios. The reasons, according to previous investigations in the literature, are
twofold. A well-known issue with rewinding is with the concurrent executions of a protocol,
rewinding may result in exceeding the probabilistic polynomial time bound on the simulation depending on the interleaving of sessions. Or, in the case where the adversary makes
use of a third party service to choose its responses in the protocol, rewinding may not be
sufficient to reset the adversary: the third party service may require to be reset, too, to
control adversary’s responses in the desired way.
Walfish [78] drew attention to a second aspect, which is directly related to deniability.
Bob, a protocol participant, may utilize an online third-party service, such as a public bulletin
board, where anyone may post data for public view and receive a unique value in return for
that data. Bob can use this service to publish everything he receives from Alice during a
session and then generate his protocol message using the unique value. Thus, Bob leaves a
public and irreversible record of his interaction with Alice. The claim is that Bob may later
prove his conversation with Alice to a judge by showing that his messages were generated
specifically as a response to Alice’s messages in the protocol. Also, rewinding Bob does not
remove the traces of this session on the public board.
We believe that attack strategies of this type, carried out with the assistance of an online
third party during the session, fall under the category of online deniability attacks. When a
third party is present to witness the interaction, the meaning and implications of rewinding
will be more involved and complex than they are in an offline context. However, this issue
of avoiding rewinding due to the risk of leaving an irrefutable trace through an online party
appears to be outside the scope of offline deniability. As a side note, none of the deniability
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proofs in our work makes use of rewinding.
In [78], Walfish objected to the use of the random oracle model or the KEA assumption
in deniability simulations, claiming that exploiting RO queries or extracting exponents (via
KEA) inherently implies that only protocol participants are capable of performing these
tasks, i.e., querying the random oracle or computing the exponentiations. He asserted that
these tasks may be performed by a trusted external party, in which case the aforementioned
benefits would not be realized. In this regard, we remark that our analysis does not make
use of viewing RO queries of the adversary. A second point to highlight is that outsourcing
some computations to an external party would not be practicable for all computations.
It is reasonable to assume that Bob requested assistance from a friend in computing, for
example, the exponent coefficient in HMQV, d = RO(A, B, X, Y ) which is computed using
only public information. However, Bob is unlikely to pass the keying material for the session
key to do the same, as this would compromise the security. The way we use the KDH
extraction assumptions is similar to the latter example. Disclosing the value we extract
would compromise the security of the protocol. (If Bob outsources computations at the cost
of compromising his security, then this scenario will be pertinent to online deniability case.)
Thus, prohibiting the use of extraction or RO in general would be excessively restrictive for
the offline deniability and would not always correspond to real-world cases.
Dodis et al [31] (is part of the work presented in [78]) formalized the notion of online
deniability for authentication protocols. This is a strong definition, which withstands the
attacks involving a judge cooperating with the adversary during the protocol run, such as
the attack mentioned above involving an online bulletin board.
They also showed that this notion is not possible to achieve in PKI model with adaptive
corruption. In order to achieve online deniability along the entire communication, the authors suggest use of a key exchange, which satisfies a weaker notion named “deniability with
incriminating abort” followed by a symmetric-key setting for conversation. Incrimination
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occurs when one protocol participant proves that its peer has participated in the protocol.
The guarantee that this new notion provides is that if the KE protocol is completed without abort, it is deniable, otherwise adversary obtains an unsimulatable information, which
permits incriminating either party.
They provided a 4-round KE protocol satisfying this weaker notion against semi-adaptive
corruption. Their primary tool to achieve this type of deniability is Dual Receiver Encryption
used among two communicating parties.
Unger et al. [74, 75] presented a series of AKE protocols, with the primary motivation
being a strong type of deniability that incorporates both offline and online forms. In [75],
the authors demonstrate with an attack why Signal is not online deniable.
However, their interpretation of offline deniability is incorrect; they focus exclusively on
transcript simulatability, omitting the requirement for session key simulatability. Therefore,
they label 3DH (actually any iAKE protocol with the same protocol communication) as a
deniable AKE with “unrestricted offline deniability,” and X3DH as having partial offline
deniability due to the use of signatures for storing ephemeral keys on the server. Section 3.4
of our work illustrates why such an incorrect use of the offline deniability definition results
in inaccurate analysis.
Recent line of research on Signal [15, 14, 42, 30] aims to develop a post-quantum secure
version of the X3DH protocol. This research focuses on abstracting X3DH and reconstructing
it using standard post-quantum secure primitives. All of these works share the objective of
developing a key exchange protocol with the same round complexity as X3DH, asynchronous
communication eligibility, deniability, and forward secrecy.
Using post-quantum KEM and two-party ring signatures, Brendel et al. [14] constructed
an AKE with the desired properties. The new protocol replaces DH operations in X3DH
with KEM and additionally transmits a signed transcript using a ring signature for the two
parties.
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The deniability property that the resulting AKE satisfies is newly defined. The authors
propose a game-based deniability definition against semi-honest adversaries: the definition
places the judge against a challenge oracle in an indistinguishability game. The oracle is
similar to a real-or-random oracle in spirit: based on a random challenge bit, the oracle
either returns a real conversation (transcript and session key) between two honest peers or
returns a simulation created using all public information and the secret key of one of the
participants. (Simulation requires the secret key of one party.)
This defines a weak form of deniability since protocol participants are required to follow
the protocol honestly. Therefore, the definition does not encompass the threat that posed
by a malicious peer, which is the primary attack strategy we focused on in our work: that
an adversary can break from the protocol to frame their peer. As this definition aims for
a basic form of deniability, the proof of deniability for their protocol doesn’t require any
non-standard extraction assumptions. A stronger aspect of the definition is that the judge
is equipped with the private and public keys of all protocol users.
With the same goal of building a post-quantum secure version of Signal, Hashimoto et.
al. [42] independently presented a key exchange protocol around the same time period, which
was also built on KEM and ring signatures (the second protocol in the article). This protocol
and the one from Brendel et. al.[14] are quite similar in design. The primary distinction
is that the former one is masking the signature with a pseudorandom value rather than
transmitting it in the clear in the round message.
Hashimoto et al. analyzed the deniability of their protocol in accordance with the definition by DiRaimondo et al. [28] with a slight modification: they omitted the auxiliary information from the judge’s and participants’ view. The authors demonstrated that the protocol
is only deniable in this sense against semi-honest adversaries, and that the proof requires no
knowledge extraction assumptions. To achieve deniability against malicious adversaries, the
authors added an NIZK proof for well-formedness of the signature keys: an adversary must
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now generate the signature verification key honestly and demonstrate knowledge of the corresponding secret key via NIZK proof. This modification achieves deniability against malicious
adversaries under the assumption that the KEMs satisfy plaintext-awareness property.
An interesting point raised in this work is that the modified protocol (which is deniable
against malicious adversaries) is not known to be secure against quantum adversaries. This
is due to the fact that the knowledge extractor that comes with plaintext-awareness is required to re-run the adversary’s algorithm fixing the randomness fed to it. In the quantum
setting, invoking an algorithm fixing the randomness is not well-defined, nor is rewinding
an algorithm (without disturbing the randomness). Consequently, the presented proof only
applies to classical adversaries.
Dobson and Galbraith [30] built a post-quantum candidate for X3DH based on the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie Hellman (SIDH) problem. The authors demonstrated the deniability
of their protocol based on the KDH assumptions presented in our study, claiming that the
KDH family extends to SIDH problem setting.
Gunn et al. [38] drew attention to the interaction between attestation and deniability
in their study. The authors showed that trusted execution environments (TEE) supporting
remote attestation (RA) can be used to circumvent the deniability of any authenticated
protocol as well as to restore it. This mechanism of TEE and RA is a combination of
hardware and software augmented to a device in order to execute critical codes securely
isolated from other software on the same device. The system provides a log of all operations
that are performed. The RA then generates records of the executed operations that are
signed using the hardware vendor’s signature key (which is hard-coded to the device). These
statements can then be verified by any party who receives the signature verification keys
from the vendor. The attested statements could take the form of “The protocol X output
Y” or “Bobs private ephemeral key y was protected by the TEE so that he could not forge
messages falsely claiming to be from Alice.”
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The following example illustrates Gunn et al.’s primary attack against deniability. Assuming that both Alice and Bob are using a deniable messaging protocol, Bob is using a
device that is equipped with a TEE, supporting RA. An adversary contacts Bob, receives
attestations, and verifies them using the verification keys of the hardware vendor. Through
the trust placed in the vendor, the adversary becomes convinced that the protocol on Bob’s
machine exchanges messages with Alice.
There are several essential points to emphasize about the attack. First, the entire attestation mechanism is executed on Bob’s device over the course of his conversation with the
adversary. Consequently, Alice is unable to detect this process. Second, the adversary is
convinced even if it does not trust Bob. The trust placed in the TEE vendor. Third, the
generated output by the TEE and RA service is transferable. Finally, the attack is applicable
to any protocol run on the TEE.
This attack goes in parallel to the bulletin board attack described above from [31]. A
similar attack strategy for keeping indisputable records of round messages at the time of the
session was also discussed in [75] (Section A.2). The use of a trusted third-party service to
provide publicly or selectively verifiable records to circumvent offline deniability is a common
element of these attacks. (We also presented comparable attack strategies in Section 4.3.)
As stated previously, we consider these types of attacks to fall under the category of online
deniability attacks. The reader can find online deniable AKE protocols that can resist these
attacks in [31, 78, 75].
A full specification of the Signal protocol can be found in [73]. As mentioned above it
uses the Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman (X3DH) key agreement protocol [57] (built on the
3DH AKE [56]) followed by a communication session which include a ratcheting mechanism
to refresh keys [62]. Security analyses of these protocols that do not include deniability can
be found in [20, 1].

Chapter 3
Deniability Analysis of iAKE
Protocols
3.1

Implicitly Authenticated Key Exchange

In this section, we recall two examples of implicitly authenticated key exchange protocols,
namely HMQV [52] (and its predecessor MQV [59, 54]) and 3DH as used in Signal [56].

3.1.1

Preliminaries

In the following, we denote with G a cyclic group of prime order q generated by g. For every
element X ∈ G there exist an integer x ∈ Zq such that X = g x . We say that x is the discrete
log of X with respect to g and denote it with x = logg X. Given two elements A = g a and
B = g b we denote with DH(A, B) = g ab = Ab = B a , the Diffie-Hellman transform of A, B,
[29].
With a ← S we denote the process of sampling a uniformly at random in the set S.
The following definition states that computing the discrete log is hard.
Definition 3.1.1. Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q generated by g. We say that
33
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the (T, ) Discrete Log Assumption holds in G if for every probabilistic Turing Machine A
running in time T we have that

P rob[x ← Zq ; A(g x ) = x] ≤ 

The following definition states that computing the Diffie-Hellman transform is hard.
Definition 3.1.2. Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q generated by g. We say that the
(T, ) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption holds in G if for every probabilistic
Turing Machine A running in time T we have that

P rob[A, B ← G ; A(A, B) = DH(A, B)] ≤ 

Consider the set G3 = G × G × G and the following two probability distributions over it:

RG = {(g a , g b , g c ) for a, b, c ← [0..q]}

and
DHG = {(g a , g b , g ab ) for a, b, ← [0..q]}
We use these distributions in the following definition:
Definition 3.1.3. We say that the (T, ) Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption holds
over G = hgi if the two distributions RG and DHG are (T, )-indistinguishable.
For Definition 3.1.3, we use Goldwasser and Micali’s classical definition of computational
indistinguishability [36].
Definition 3.1.4. Let X , Y be two probability distributions over A. Given a circuit D, the
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distinguisher, consider the following quantities

δD,X = P robx∈X [D(x) = 1]

δD,Y = P roby∈Y [D(y) = 1]
We say that the probability distributions X and Y are (T, )-indistinguishable if for every
probabilistic Turing Machine D running in time T we have that |δD,X − δD,Y | ≤ .

3.1.2

MQV and HMQV Protocols

The MQV protocol was introduced in [59] and further specified in [54]. A formal analysis
of its security properties was presented by Krawczyk in [52] where he also presented an
improved version called HMQV to address some of MQV’s weaknesses uncovered by the
analysis. In Figure 3.1, we describe both protocols.
Note that in MQV the session key is defined as the group element K̃ (with the use of
a hash function left as optional), while HMQV mandates the use of a hash function H to
derive the session key from the secret value K̃ shared by Alice and Bob.

3.1.3

Triple Diffie-Hellman

The Triple Diffie-Hellman (3DH) protocol creates a shared secret key between two parties
who authenticate each other via public keys [56], with deniability being one of its claimed
features (but never formally proven until now).
3DH is the key exchange that underlies secure communication in the Signal messaging
application. We postpone discussions about how 3DH is used inside Signal to Section 3.7.
Here, we simply describe 3DH as a basic key exchange protocol where both parties are alive
and communicating with each other.
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MQV and HMQV Protocols
Public Input: A = g a , B = g b public keys of Alice and Bob respectively.
Secret Input of Alice: a; Secret Input of Bob: b;
Alice

Bob
X = gx

x ← {1, . . . , q}

-

Y = gy


y ← {1, . . . , q}
K̃ = (XAd )y+eb

K̃ = (Y B e )x+da

MQV:
HMQV:

K = K̃, d = 2` + (X mod 2` ), e = 2` + (Y mod 2` ), ` = |q|/2.
K = H(K̃), d = h(X, idBob ), e = h(Y, idAlice ),
where h(·), H(·) are suitable hash functions.

Figure 3.1: Computation of the session key K in MQV and HMQV protocols
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Figure 3.2 describes the protocol. As for the case of MQV Alice and Bob have long-term
public keys A = g a , B = g b and exchange ephemeral public keys X, Y . What changes is
how the session key is computed. The “three Diffie-Hellman” part refers to three separate
Diffie-Hellman operators concatenated together and then passed to a hash function to derive
a key.
3DH Protocol
Public Input: A = g a , B = g b public keys of Alice and Bob respectively.
Secret Input of Alice: a; Secret Input of Bob: b;
Alice

Bob
X = gx

x ← {1, . . . , q}

-

Y = gy


y ← {1, . . . , q}
K = H(Ay ||X y ||X b )

K = H(Y a ||Y x ||B x )
where || denotes concatenation and H(·) is a suitable hash function.
Figure 3.2: Triple Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol

3.1.4

Key Registration

The protocols described above assume that participants have long-term public keys that are
associated to their identity via some form of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Certification
authorities often require that at the time of key registration, participants prove knowledge
of their secret key. If this is done via an extractable proof of knowledge, e.g., via a Schnorr
proof [68], proving deniability can be simplified by assuming the simulator can extract the
private key of the participants. Some of our proofs (e.g., for Theorems 3.6.2, 3.6.4 and
3.7.2) are simplified by assuming such a “Key Registration” setting. However, we later show
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(Section 3.8) that in all these cases, a slight strengthening of our assumptions gets rid of the
need to assume private-key extractability.

3.2

Deniable Key Exchange

We recall the definition of deniable Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE in the rest) from [28,
31, 78].
An AKE protocol works with two parties, A and B, who want to agree on a secret key K.
Each party has a long-term public/secret key pair which is associated to the party through
a trusted registry. These key pairs are generated via a key generation phase. For notation
purposes, A has public key pkA and secret key skA – B has pkB and skB .
One of A and B acts as the initiator and the other acts as the responder. The protocol
results in session key K. Informally, security for AKE requires that if an honest party A
outputs key K and associates it to an honest party B, then no party other than B may know
anything about K. Additional security properties can be enforced, such as perfect forward
secrecy (past session keys remain secure, even if long-term keys are compromised), security
against state compromise (ephemeral values are revealed to the adversary), etc. A formal
treatment of AKE security can be found in [6, 71, 17, 19].
Informally we say that an AKE is deniable if it prevents A or B from proving to a
third party (which we will call the judge) that an AKE occurred with a particular party. A
weaker goal is to be able to deny just the contents of communication protected by the AKE’s
resulting key.
Recall that a KE protocol involves two communicating parties: the initiator, who sends
the first message, and the responder. Let Σ denote an AKE protocol with key generation
algorithm KG and interactive machines ΣI and ΣR , which respectively denote the roles of
the initiator and responder. Both ΣI and ΣR take as input their own secret and public keys.
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In most cases, they also take in the identity and public key of their peer, but other AKE
protocols specify that the parties learn this information during the session [18]. The term
session denotes an individual run of a KE protocol. When the protocol finishes, it outputs
either an error or a session key.
Adversary. Let M denote an adversary that runs on an arbitrary number of randomly
~ = (pk1 , . . . , pkl ) generated by KG. The algorithm associates the keys
chosen public keys pk
to honest users in the network. M’s input also includes some arbitrary auxiliary information
aux ∈ AUX. The adversary runs Σ with an arbitrary number of honest users. Sometimes
M acts as the initiator, and other times M acts as the responder. The individual sessions
run in a concurrent setting, so M may schedule and interleave them arbitrarily.
View. We define the view of the adversary M as its internal coin tosses, the transcript of
the entire interaction, and the session keys from each session that M participates either as
an initiator or responder. Sessions that do not produce keys result in a key defined by an
~ aux).
error value. We denote this view by ViewM (pk,
Simulator. In order to demonstrate deniability with respect to initiator (resp., responder),
the simulator takes the role of the initiator I (resp., responder R) and imitates I (resp., R)
without having the long-term secret key skI (resp., skR ).
~ of all parties and
As input, the simulator receives some random coins, the public keys pk
~ aux) by interacting
any auxiliary input aux available to the adversary. It generates SimM (pk,
~ aux) includes the transcript and the resulting
with the adversary M as its peer. SimM (pk,
shared key of the session.
The simulator provides the inputs to the adversary M prior to the protocol execution
and observes all communication M has with its environment (such as AKE sessions M
holds with other honest parties and the random oracle queries). The random oracle (RO)
queries made by the adversary are visible to the simulator. However, the simulator might
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not be able to freely tamper with the RO input-output pairs (program the RO), because the
judge is granted access to the random oracles, too. Therefore the RO queries involved in the
simulation are expected to be consistent with the possible queries made by the judge and
other honest parties running a session with the adversary.
Definition 3.2.1 ([28]). An AKE protocol (KG, ΣI , ΣR ) is (TM , TS , TD , ) concurrently deniable with respect to the class of auxiliary inputs AUX if for any adversary M running
~ = (pk1 , . . . , pkl ) generated by KG and
in time TM , on input honest parties’ public keys pk
any auxiliary input aux ∈ AUX, there exists a simulator SIM running in time TS on the
same inputs as M which produces a simulated view Sim(pk, aux) such that the following
two distributions are (TD , )-indistinguishable:
~ ViewM (pk,
~ aux))]
Real(aux) = [(sk, pk)I,R ← KG; (aux, pk,
~ SimM (pk,
~ aux))]
Sim(aux) = [(sk, pk)I,R ← KG; (aux, pk,

The definition follows the usual simulation paradigm which guarantees that the judge cannot
decide if anything that the adversary presents (the view) is the result of an interaction
with a real party or the product of a simulation. As pointed out by Pass in [61], the
simulation requirements for deniability are stronger than for Zero-Knowledge simulation as
the simulation is not just a “thought experiment” but it needs to run in the real world; for
example, random oracle programmability is not allowed since the distinguisher (the judge
in the deniability setting) has access to a (real-world) pre-defined hash function. The same
holds for trapdoored common reference strings.
Why is the session key included in the view. We are interested in the deniability of
the full communication protected by the session key, not just deniability of the key exchange
run. Limiting deniability to the key exchange transcript only, would allow for situations
where Bob could not prove Alice’s participation in a key exchange session but could do so
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once the session key is used (we show such an example in the context of the non-deniability
of MQV in Section 3.4.1). Fortunately, by simply including the session key in the view that
the deniability simulator needs to produce, one guarantees that any application using the
session key (and otherwise public information) will be as deniable as the key exchange itself
(namely, the joint transcript of the key exchange session and the ensuing application can be
simulated). This important consequence of the above definition is formalized and proven in
Theorem 3.3.2.

3.3

Deniable Sessions

As we noted above the definition of deniability of an AKE explicitly includes the session key
in the view in order for us to claim that any deniability is preserved in any subsequent use of
the key in the session that follows the AKE. We now formally prove this statement1 . First
we define deniability for an arbitrary interactive protocol between two parties, and then we
show that any communication structured as an AKE, followed by messages where the two
parties only use the session key (but not their long-term secret keys) is deniable.
~ interacts with the parties holding the public
Consider an adversary M that on input pk
keys. The adversary also may have auxiliary input aux drawn from distribution AUX.
M initiates several concurrent interactions with the parties and we define the adversary’s
view of the interaction as M’s coin tosses together with the transcript of the full interactions.
~ aux).
We denote the view as View(pk,
Definition 3.3.1. We say that an interactive protocol P (KG, I, R) is (TM , TS , TD , )-concurrently
deniable with respect to the class of auxiliary inputs AUX if for any adversary M running
~ = (pk , . . . , pk ) generated by KG and
in time TM , on input honest parties’ public keys pk
1
l
1

This was claimed informally and without proof in [28]; here, we use this result in essential
way in Section 3.7 to show how deniability of 3DH carries to deniability of the whole Signal
protocol.
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any auxiliary input aux ∈ AUX, there exists a simulator SIMM running in time TS on the
same inputs as M, such that the following two distributions are (TD , )-indistinguishable
~ View(pk,
~ aux))]
Real(aux) = [(ski , pki ) ← KG; (aux, pk,
~ SIM (pk,
~ aux))]
Sim(aux) = [(ski , pki ) ← KG; (aux, pk,

We now define a session. Consider two parties Alice and Bob with associated public
keys pkA , pkB . They also hold private keys skA , skB respectively, and also additional inputs
xA , xB . We say that an interactive protocol P between Alice and Bob is a session if
• P = [P1 , P2 ] where P1 is an AKE. Let K be the session key resulting from the execution
of P1
• every message sent by Alice (resp. Bob) in P2 is a function only of the transcript so
far, the private input xA (resp. xB ), and the session key K, but not of the private keys
skA (resp. skB )
Theorem 3.3.2. Let P = [P1 , P2 ] be a session, where P1 is a deniable authenticated key
exchange according to Definition 3.2.1, which includes the session key in the view. Then P
is deniable according to Definition 3.3.1.
Proof. Based on Definition 3.3.1, a deniability simulator for P is required to simulate the
transcript between the parties only, i.e. t~rP1 and t~rP2 , which denote the transcript of P1 and
P2 , respectively.
Since P1 is (TM1 , TS1 , TD1 , 1 )-deniable, we know that for any adversary M1 running in
time TM1 , there exists a simulator running in TS1 which outputs a simulation of transcript
∗
and session key: {t~rP1 , K ∗ }.
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For all distinguishers D1 running in time TD1 ,
∗

~ t~r , K ∗ , coinsM ) = 1]
|P r[D1 (pk,
1
P1
~ t~rP , K, coinsM ) = 1]| ≤ 1 .
− P r[D1 (pk,
1
1

Assume, for contradiction, that P is not deniable. So there is an adversary M for protocol
∗

P running in time TM such that for every simulator S that runs in TS and outputs t~rP , there
exists a distinguisher D running in TD such that
~ t~r∗ , coinsM ) = 1]
|P r[D(pk,
P
~ t~rP , coinsM ) = 1]| > .
− P r[D(pk,

Let us run M on P . This induces an adversary M1 on P1 for which we should have a
∗
“good” simulator S1 which outputs a simulated transcript and session key {t~rP1 , K ∗ }.

We now “extend” S1 to a full simulator S for P . Using the simulated session key K ∗ ,
the simulator S will simulate the honest party’s message: recall that those messages are a
function of only the transcript so far, the additional inputs xA (or xB ) and the session key2 .
For this simulator we have a distinguisher D which distinguishes the simulated transcript
from the real one.
~ t~rP , K, coinsM } it needs to
We now can build a distinguisher D1 for S1 . Given {pk,
1
1
decide if it is the real view of the AKE P1 or the output of S1 .
The first thing that D1 does is to extend these view to a full view for P , the same way
in which S does it. Note that if D1 runs on input the real view of P1 then it obtains the real
view of P . But if D1 runs on input the simulated view of P1 created by S1 then it obtains
the simulated view of S. Therefore it can call D on its input and distinguish with the same
2

Here, we assume that the auxiliary inputs xA and xB are not tied to the identity of the
party (as opposed to skA and skB ) and therefore can be given to the simulator.
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probability that D does.

3.4

Negative examples

In this section, we are going to examine the difficulty in simulating an execution of implicitly
authenticated key exchange protocols such as MQV, HMQV and 3DH. We will show a
strategy that (on certain groups) allows an adversary to prove that an interaction took
place. This negative result will then point the way to what type of assumption about the
underlying group we need to make to guarantee deniability in a provable way.
We focus on MQV, but the issues we raise here will lead to an understanding of deniability
conditions for HMQV and 3DH. Consider the MQV protocol in Figure 3.1 and let us try to
prove that the protocol is deniable for Alice. In other words we need to construct a simulator
SIM who plays the role of Alice while talking to Bob. SIM is given the public key of Alice,
A = g a , but not the corresponding secret key, a.
SIM runs Bob to simulate the conversation and observes all of Bob’s communication in
his environment. SIM starts by providing the random coins r, and, if available, the auxiliary
information to Bob. SIM then chooses a random x and sends out X = g x to Bob. In return
it receives a group member Y ∈ G from Bob. SIM’s final output must be indistinguishable
from Bob’s view (r, X, Y, K) and the only thing that SIM does not know is K. Recall that
in MQV
K = g xy g ayd g xbe g abde
where e, d are values computed from the transcript.
When Bob is honestly executing the protocol, the simulator is easy to construct. If Bob
follows the protocol and computes Y as g y for y ← Zq , the simulator can do exactly the
same thing and compute the session key K = g xy Ayd (XAd )be . Here, we assume that the
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simulator gets Bob’s private key3 .
However, a malicious Bob can deviate from the protocol at will and having Bob’s random
coins provides SIM no information about how Y is actually sampled. In the simulation above,
SIM can compute two of the DH values g xy = Y x and (XAd )be since b and x are known. But
DH(A, Y ) = g ay cannot be computed because neither a (secret key of Alice) nor y = logg Y
is known to SIM (maybe not even to Bob).
The only option for SIM would be putting a random string as the simulated key, hoping
that a random value is indistinguishable from the actual key.

Such strategy would work

if we could invoke the DDH assumption to claim the two distributions are indistinguishable. However, a random string does not necessarily substitute for g ay , because though a is
uniformly selected, DDH does not apply for an adversarially chosen Y .

3.4.1

When MQV is provably non-deniable

The discussion above shows that an adversarially chosen Y is a barrier to prove deniability
for MQV. We now prove that over some groups, it is actually impossible to prove that MQV
is deniable, because there is a strategy for Bob to prove that he interacted with Alice.
Assume we are running the protocol over a cyclic group G setting where:
1. The DDH problem is easy
2. The following experiment succeeds with negligible probability for every efficient adversary Adv and any efficiently samplable distribution Y
• Adv runs on input A, B ∈ G chosen uniformly at random and outputs X ∈ G
• Adv receives Y ∈ G chosen according to Y
3

For showing the failure of (proofs of) deniability, assuming the simulator gets b makes
our negative result stronger as it implies that even if we allow key registration we do not
know how to simulate, and in some cases simulation is actually impossible.
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• Adv succeeds if it outputs KA = (XAd )y (XAd )be = DH(XAd , Y )DH(XAd , B e )
where d, e are defined as in the MQV protocol
We note that (2) follows from the KCI security of MQV, namely, the values x and b do not
suffice to compute the session key. Point (1) holds, for example, if G is a bilinear group.
On assuming that the DDH problem is easy. Before we proceed with our counterexample, let us discuss our assumption that the DDH problem is easy in G. In this case, the
security of MQV cannot be proven in the sense of the session key being indistinguishable from
a random group element. Does this mean that our counter-example shows non-deniability
of a protocol that is insecure as a key-exchange scheme? Is there value in doing so? There
are several answers to this point:
• First, one can consider a weaker security notion for key exchange where the goal is
for the session key to be unpredictable. We illustrate the utility of such notion in
the “bearer token” example below. Furthermore, an unpredictable key with sufficient
(computational) entropy, but not necessarily indistinguishable from random, can be
converted into a strong key using a randomness extractor. MQV could conceivably
satisfy such property, be secure as a key exchange, and still be non-deniable.
• Deniability is an orthogonal property to that of security. Our counter-example is designed to illustrate the difficulties of proving deniability for MQV and similar protocols,
and demonstrating the failure of the intuition that the sole lack of explicit authentication methods (such as digital signatures) is sufficient to assume that deniability holds.
• Additionally, there are so-called trapdoor DDH groups [24, 69], where the DDH problem
is conjectured to be hard unless one is in possession of a trapdoor. In this case, the
protocol is secure for anybody who does not possess the trapdoor but non-deniable for
a judge who holds the trapdoor.

CHAPTER 3. DENIABILITY ANALYSIS OF IAKE PROTOCOLS

47

The counter-example (incriminating Alice). We show a strategy that incriminates
Alice over groups where the DDH problem is easy. A malicious Bob samples Y uniformly
at random in the group but in a way in which he can demonstrate that he does not know
y = logg Y , for example by hashing a publicly known string (e.g. today’s copy of the NY
Times) into a group element via a sufficiently complicated hash function (which could be
modeled as a random oracle4 ).
We now prove by contradiction that there cannot be a simulator. If there is a simulator SIM, let KS be the key provided by the simulator, while K = (XAd )y (XAe )b =
DH(XAd , Y )DH(XAe , B) is the real key. We assume that Bob is willing to reveal b to the
judge in order to prove that an interaction took place.
The knowledge of b allows the judge to compute z = DH(XAd , B e ) = (XAd )be . Since
the DDH is easy, the judge can decide if K = KS by checking if KS · z −1 = DH(XAd , Y ).
Therefore, anything other than the authentic key is detected by the judge. So the only
possible successful simulator is the one that outputs KS = K. But such simulator contradicts
assumption (2) above and the security of MQV.
So all that Bob needs to do to be able to prove Alice communicated with him is to choose
a value Y = g y for which Bob could not possibly know y (as described above) and obtain
the (unhashed) MQV key computed by Alice on the quadruple (A, X, B, Y ). As an example
of an application that would disclose this value to Bob (without Bob being able to compute
it by himself), consider a key exchange protocol whose session key is used as a bearer token
(cf., RFC 6750 [46]) that a user needs to present for obtaining access to some controlled
resource (e.g., a non-public webpage, a printing service, etc.). Here, the user Alice would
run MQV with the server Bob to obtain the bearer token in the form of an MQV key which
Alice later submits to Bob for gaining access to the resource. Server Bob could choose Y
4

It is not necessary to model this hash as a random oracle, as long as we assume that
computing g ay is hard when A = g a is sampled uniformly at random and Y = g y is sampled
according to the procedure used by Bob.
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as above, receive the token (=key) from Alice and use this key to prove she communicated
with him (note that the computation of the key is specific to Bob’s public key thus proving
Alice’s intention to have this communication with Bob). In other words, this example shows
that the non-deniability of MQV can be actually exploited in practice. We further note that
the above bearer-token application illustrates how a key exchange like MQV that outputs
an unpredictable value (rather than a key that is indistinguishable from a random string)
can have significant value in practice.
3DH without hashing. It is not hard to see that a similar reasoning applies to an “unhashed” version of 3DH where the session key is set as K = DH(A, Y )||DH(X, Y )||DH(X, B).
Therefore such a version of 3DH would also be provably non-deniable under the above conditions.

3.4.2

Does the random oracle help?

In HMQV and 3DH the session key is computed by hashing the secret shared value, i.e.

K = H[DH(XAd , Y )DH(XAd , B e )]

in HMQV and
K = H[DH(A, Y )||DH(X, Y )||DH(X, B)]
in 3DH. If we model H as a random oracle, would this help in solving the problems described
in the previous section?
The question is still how can the simulator provide a session key which is indistinguishable
from the real one. In this case, one would hope that the use of the random oracle will allow
the simulator to identify the key. Assume Bob is the malicious party and can deviate from the
honest execution of the protocol. Every time Bob makes a random oracle query, SIM sees
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it (even though it is not allowed to choose the answer for it [61]). In particular, if Bob
computes the real session key K in HMQV that matches A, B, X, Y , then he must have
queried DH(XAd , Y )DH(XAd , B e ) (resp. DH(A, Y )||DH(X, Y )||DH(X, B) for 3DH) to
the random oracle.
Note that even if Bob queries the RO on these values, it is not clear how the simulator can
identify the correct query that corresponds to the computation of the session key. Indeed,
the simulator SIM is able to compute g bx and g xy , but cannot compute g ay since a and y are
not known. If Y is uniformly distributed and the DDH holds, SIM cannot provably detect
which query corresponds to the session key5 .
The only option for the simulator is to choose a random value as the key, but this is
distinguishable from the real view if Bob presents to the judge the correct input to the
random oracle (e.g. Bob knows y = logg Y and can convince the judge that the session key
was computed using the correct input).
Note that if this is the case, Bob still cannot convince the judge that he spoke to Alice.
In fact if Bob knows y, then the entire transcript could be his own creation without ever
interacting with Alice.
In other words, we have one of two possible cases: either Bob does not know y (and the
input to the random oracle) in which case the simulator should be able to put a random
key in the view, or Bob knows y (and the correct input to the random oracle) in which case
the simulator should be able to identify the correct key from the knowledge of Bob. The
problem is that we do not know which case we are in, and therefore we cannot complete the
simulation successfully.
The way out of this problem is described in the next section and relies on an appropriate
5

One could use a Gap-DDH Assumption, which states that the CDH Assumption holds
even in the presence of an oracle that decides the DDH. Then such oracle could be provided
to the simulator to detect the query. Yet this simulator would not be a legitimate deniability
simulator unless the oracle could be implemented in real-life.
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“knowledge extraction” from Bob, which will address also the issues related to the counterexample from Section 3.4.1.

3.5

A characterization for non-deniability

In this section, we show that the sampling strategy shown above to make MQV non-deniable
is essentially the only strategy that can achieve so. That is, we prove that if an adversary is
able to “frame” one of the parties in the MQV protocol and prove that an interaction took
place, then we have a way to sample a group element Y in G in a way that it is hard to
compute DH(A, Y ) for a fixed group element A but it is easy to detect that DH(A, Y ) is
correct.
The consequence is that if we assume that such a task is computationally infeasible then
we can conclude (albeit non-constructively, see below) that the MQV protocol is deniable.
Details follows.
Non-deniable AKE. First we define what a non-deniable or incriminating AKE is, as the
logical negation of deniability.
We call a key exchange protocol (KG, I, R) as (TM , TSIM , TJ , εJ )-incriminating if there is
an adversary M running in time TM such that for all simulators SIM running in time TSIM ,
there exists a judge J running in time TJ which distinguishes the uniformly selected samples
from the following distributions with probability at least εJ .

Real = {ViewM (pki )}(ski ,pki )←KG
Sim = {SIMM (pki )}(ski ,pki )←KG

|P rx∈Real [J(x) = 1] − P rx∈Sim [J(x) = 1]| ≥ εJ
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ViewM includes the public keys, the transcript, the session key and random coins r given to
M. (ski , pki ) denotes long-term key pairs of parties for i ∈ {I, R} (I for initializer, R for
responder).

3.5.1

Bad Sampler

We now define a particular type of sampling algorithm for G which we call a Bad Sampler.
We will prove that the existence of a bad sampler is equivalent to MQV being incriminating.
We say that a sampling algorithm for G is (TSamp , TSolv , TD , εSolv , εD )-Bad if the following
conditions are satisfied:
There exists a sampling algorithm Sample which satisfies the following
1. Sample takes as input A (uniformly picked from G) and the random coins r to generate
Y = Sample(A, r) running in time ≤ TSamp .
2. ∀ Solve running in TSolv
P r Solve, A, r [Solve(A, Y, r) = g ay | Y = Sample(A, r)] ≤ εSolv

Probability is over the randomness of Solve, uniform choice of A = g a and random
coins r.
3. There exists a distinguisher D running in time ≤ TD which tells apart g ay from a
random group member ĝ ← G for a uniformly chosen A and random coins r.

|P rD, A, r [D(A, Y, r, g ay ) = 1 | Y = Sample(A, r)]−
P rD, A, r [D(A, Y, r, ĝ) = 1 | Y = Sample(A, r)]| ≥ εD
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Equivalence between Bad Sampling and Incrimination

In the following Theorem, if T is the running time of an algorithm then the notation T̃
means T plus a constant number of exponentiations in G.
Theorem 3.5.1. If there is a (TSamp , TSolv , TD , εSolv , εD )-bad sampler in G then the MQV
protocol is (T̃M , T̃SIM , T̃J , εJ )-incriminating with εJ = εD (1 − εSolv ).
Conversely if the MQV protocol run over G is (TM , TSIM , TJ , εJ )-incriminating then there
exists a (T̃Samp , T̃Solv , T̃D , εSolv , εD )-bad sampler for G, with εSolv = (1 − εJ ) and εD = εJ .
Malicious Initiator. The theorem above proves the equivalence of bad sampling with
the non-deniability of MQV for the initiator when interacting with a malicious responder.
It is also not hard to see that a similar theorem holds for the case of a malicious initiator
who is trying to incriminate the responder. In this case also, the only possible strategy for
a malicious initiator will be to run a bad sampler.
Theorem Interpretation. The above theorem, which will guide us towards the proof of
deniability in Section 3.6, characterizes the strategy that the adversary needs to follow to be
able to incriminate one of the parties: the only way to do it is to be able to sample elements
Y in G such that for every element A ← G it is easy to decide if DH(A, Y ) is correct while
it is still hard to compute it. If we assume that such “bad” sampling is infeasible, then
we immediately have a proof that the protocols are deniable. Yet such proof is a “nonconstructive” one, as we are not able to show how the simulator works, but just that it must
exist. The significance of such a statement in real-life is not clear, as plausible deniability
requires the judge to actually run a simulator to counter Bob’s statement that he spoke to
Alice. In the absence of such real simulator, there is no way to argue that the conversation
was not generated by Alice, even if we assume that bad sampling is impossible.
As before we are stuck on the fact that when we are trying to simulate a malicious Bob
we do not know if he did sample Y = g y with or without knowledge of y (or more precisely
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with or without knowledge of DH(A, Y )). The above theorem says that if bad sampling
is impossible then either Bob must know DH(A, Y ) or the value is indistinguishable from
random: in either case we would be able to successfully complete the simulation if we knew
which case we were in (and in the former be able to “extract” DH(A, Y )). But the mere
assumption that bad sampling is impossible does not give us this knowledge, and therefore
leaves us stuck in the construction of a simulator.
The next section shows how to define an appropriate “knowledge extractor” for Bob, that
will allow us to build a simulator.

3.5.3

Proof of Theorem 3.5.1

Proof. The proof we present is for the case in which the adversary plays the role of Bob,
the responder. A similar proof can be easily replicated for the case in which the adversary
plays the role of Alice (the initiator).
We assume that the long-term key B = g b of Bob is certified which means that the secret
key b is available to the simulator. Also we assume that Bob is willing to reveal b to the
judge when trying to incriminate Alice.
Bad Sampler =⇒ MQV is Incriminating
Here, we assume that we have algorithms Sample and D according to the definition of Bad
Sampler. Let Bob* be the malicious responder.
• Bob* runs on input A = g a and X = g x the long-term and ephemeral keys of Alice
(respectively). He randomizes those keys as follows

Â := Adα .g u
0

X̂ := X α .g u
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where d is defined as in the MQV protocol (it only depends on X).
• Bob* selects coin tosses r and invokes the bad sampler on the product Z = ÂX̂

Y = Sample(Z, r)

and sends Y as its response. Let Y = g y (but we do not know y).
• Let now SIM be a simulator running in time < T̃Solv , and let S be the output of SIM
for the session key which we denote as

S = (XAd )y (XAd )be g λ = Kg λ

i.e. the session key K = (XAd )y (XAe )b times an offsetting factor g λ . Here, e is defined
as in the MQV protocol (depends on Y ).
• Since SIM runs in time < T̃Solv it must be that λ = 0 with probability at most εSolv . In
fact if λ = 0 then we have a solver Solve running in time < TSolv which computes Z y
which can only happen with probability at most εSolv . The solver runs as follows
– Runs SIM to obtain S = K = (XAd )y (XAd )be
– Computes Ŝ = S(XAd )−be = (XAd )y – here, we assume that Solve knows b since
it has the coin tosses of Bob*
0

0

– Compute S 0 = Ŝ α · Y u+u = [Adα g u X α g u ]y = Z y
• We now build a judge J running in time T̃D . Given the output S of SIM it computes
0

Ŝ = S(XAd )−be = (XAd )y g λ and S 0 = Ŝ α · Y u+u = Z y g αλ and then runs the bad
sampler distinguisher D on it.
Note that if λ = 0, then D cannot distinguish, but if λ 6= 0 the value S 0 is uniformly
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distributed in G. Therefore the distinguisher D is guaranteed to distinguish with
probability > εD .
Therefore our judge distinguishes with probability J > εD (1 − εSolv ).
MQV is Incriminating =⇒ Bad Sampler
Given a bad Bob* and a judge J we need to construct a bad sampler Sample and a distinguisher D.
Construction of Sample
• Let Z be the input given to Sample. The sampler chooses at random X = g x , computes
d as in the MQV protocol and solves for A such that Ad X = Z
• Sample runs Bob* on input A, X and coin tosses r, and output the Y that Bob*
outputs. Note that Sample runs in time T̃M where TM is the running time of the
adversary (Bob*).
Let Solve be an algorithm running in time T̃SIM which computes DH(Z, Y ). Then consider
the simulator SIM running in time TSIM which runs Solve to compute Z y = (Ad X)y and then
compute K = Z y (Ad X)be (again we assume the simulator knows b). This is a perfect
simulation and therefore fools any judge. But we know that for every simulator there is a
judge that distinguishes with probability > εJ so the algorithm Solve can only succeed with
probability < 1 − εJ .
Finally consider the simulator SIMR which outputs a random session key R. For this
simulator there is a judge J that distinguishes with probability > εJ . Then we can build
our distinguisher D as follows. Given a value W that it is either Z y or random R0 the
distinguisher computes W (Ad X)be which is either the correct key or a random value (i.e. the
output of SIMR ). If we run J on this value we distinguish with probability > εJ .
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Deniability Proof

As we discussed in the previous section, the roadblock in the construction of a deniability
simulator is that the simulator does not know if a malicious Bob knows the value DH(A, Y )
or not, at the moment Bob sends Y out. In the case of MQV, we also showed that the
only way a malicious Bob can frame Alice is if he samples a Y for which he does not know
DH(A, Y ), but such value can be efficiently recognized as correct (i.e. distinguished from a
random value).

3.6.1

The Case of MQV

The above discussion therefore points out to the natural definition of a “knowledge extractor” which allows us to build a simulator for MQV. If we assume that given a malicious
responder Bob, we can either (i) extract the value DH(A, Y ) or (ii) assume that DH(A, Y )
is indistinguishable from random, then the simulator immediately follows as the output of
the extractor will be the simulated key.
We call this the Strong Knowledge of DH (SKDH) Assumption and it is defined below. In
the next section we define a weaker version of this assumption which will be sufficient to
prove HMQV and 3DH.
Definition 3.6.1. Let G be a cyclic group and AUX a class of auxiliary inputs. Let M be
a probabilistic Turing Machine running in time TM on input (U, aux) where U ← G, and
aux ∈ AUX, and outputs Z ∈ G; we denote with Z = M (U, aux, r) the output of running
M on input U, aux with coin tosses r. We say that the (TM , TM̂ , TD , εD )-SKDH Assumption
holds over group G and class AUX, if for every such M , there exists a companion probabilistic
Turing Machine M̂ (called the extractor for M ) such that: M̂ runs on input (U, aux, r) in
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time TM̂ and outputs Ẑ ∈ G such that the distributions

[U, aux, r, DH(U, Z)] and [U, aux, r, Ẑ]

are (TD , εD )-indistinguishable.
Remark: Basically the assumption says that for every sampler M of a value Z, there is
an extractor that either computes DH(U, Z) or produces an output distribution that is
computationally indistinguishable from DH(U, Z) even when given the internal coin tosses
of M . The assumption is written generically: when Bob [resp. Alice] is the adversary U = A
[resp. U = B] the peer’s long-term public key, and Z = Y [resp. Z = X] the adversary’s
ephemeral value.
Recall from Section 3.1.4 that we assume key registration as a way for the simulator to
extract the private key of the attacker. We note that we can prove MQV deniability without
key registration by strengthening the SKDH assumption.
Theorem 3.6.2. Under the (TM , TM̂ , TD , εD ) SKDH Assumption, MQV with Key Registration is a (T̃M , T̃M̂ , T̃D , εD ) deniable AKE.
Proof. We prove deniability for the initiator. The proof for the responder is similar.
SIM, on input public key A of Alice (but not her secret key a), interacts with the adversary
Bob. Because we assume Key Registration, Bob has proven knowledge of his secret key b
during key registration and therefore we can assume that SIM has extracted it.
SIM runs the algorithm of Bob with input A, aux0 , r (where aux0 = aux||X) and receives
Y as Bob’s ephemeral public key. Then it runs the extractor for Bob which is provided by
the SKDH assumption (with U = A).
Let Ẑ be the extractor’s output. SIM computes the key using Ẑ as (Ad X)be Ẑ d Y x .
For contradiction, assume a judge J running in time TJ distinguishes the key resulting
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from a real execution Kreal = DH(Ad X, B e Y ) from a simulated key Ksim = (Ad X)be Ẑ d Y x
with probability εJ :
p = P r[J(A, B, X, Y, Kreal , aux, r) = 1]
p̂ = P r[J(A, B, X, Y, Ksim , aux, r) = 1]
|p − p̂| > εJ
This contradicts the indistinguishability claim of SKDH assumption for the parameters εJ =
εD and TJ = (TD + constant number of exponentiations and multiplications).

3.6.2

The Case of HMQV and 3DH

For HMQV and 3DH we can use a weaker assumption. In this case, when the extractor fails
to produce DH(A, Y ) we do not need to establish that DH(A, Y ) is indistinguishable from
random, but rather that it is infeasible to compute. This is sufficient because the session key
(in both HMQV and 3DH) is the result of a random oracle call over a function of DH(A, Y ).
Thus if the random oracle is not queried on this value, then the session key can be simulated
with a random value.
Before presenting the KDH assumption on which the deniability of HMQV and 3DH will
be proven, we motivate it on the basis of the well-known Knowledge of Exponent Assumption
(KEA) [22, 5]. Recall that, informally, KEA states that for any algorithm M that on input
(g, g u ) outputs a pair (Z, Z u ), there is an algorithm M 0 that outputs z such that Z = g z .
Machine M 0 runs on the same inputs as M , including same random coins. (Here g is a
generator of the group G, u is chosen uniformly and Z can be any group element.) .
Can we base deniability on KEA? At first glance, it would seem that the deniability
of HMQV and 3DH will follow from KEA. Indeed, in the case of an adversarial Bob, the
simulator SIM needs to learn whether Bob computed the session key K and if so what the
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value of K was. To compute K, Bob must query the necessary DH values, e.g., DH(A, Y ),
from the random oracle RO. If Bob does query these values, SIM can learn K; if it does not,
then SIM can replace K with a random value. The question is how does SIM identify which
query to the RO equaled DH(A, Y ), if any. For this, SIM can resort to the KEA extractor
which upon computation of V = DH(A, Y ) by Bob outputs y = dlog(Y ), thus allowing
SIM to check if indeed Y = g y and V = Ay . So it seems that we are done and KEA is all
that is needed here.
But there is a problem. Consider the following scenario. Bob does not query the RO
on the required values during the simulated session and does not compute K, so SIM sets
the key to a random value K 0 . Later, Bob provides y and b to the judge who can compute
the key K and make the simulation fail by distinguishing K from K 0 . To prevent this
“trivial” simulation failure we need to assume that if it is possible at all to efficiently compute
the session key K given the information Bob has, then there exists an extractor that on the
same inputs of Bob (including Bob’s random coins) produces K. Then SIM can use this
extractor to output the key K, and if the extractor does not output K then SIM sets it to
a random value K 0 . In the latter case, it is guaranteed that the judge will not be able to
compute the key K and distinguish the simulation. In general terms, what this approach
captures is the fact that SIM (acting as the alter ego of Bob), can use Bob in a non-blackbox way and extract from it all knowledge needed to complete a successful simulation. In
particular, if the distinguisher (judge) can compute the correct key K based on the attacker’s
(Bob) view, so should SIM.
So to use KEA, we would need to strengthen it by requiring not only that if Bob computed
DH(A, Y ) then the extractor outputs y = dlog(Y ), but also that if Bob does not output
DH(A, Y ) then no other machine has a non-negligible probability of outputting DH(A, Y )
(or y itself) on Bob’s inputs (more precisely, that no machine can succeed with non-negligible
probability over the distribution of inputs where Bob failed to output DH(A,Y)).
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The following KDH assumption is a generalization of this KEA strengthening.
Definition 3.6.3. Let G be a cyclic group and AUX a class of auxiliary inputs. Let M
be a probabilistic Turing Machine running in time TM which runs on input (U, aux) where
U ← G, and aux ∈ AUX, and outputs Z ∈ G; we denote with Z = M (U, aux, r) the output
of running M on input U, aux with coin tosses r.
We say that the (TM , TM̂ , TG , εG ) Knowledge of DH (KDH) Assumption holds over group
G and class AUX, if for every such M , there exists a companion probabilistic Turing Machine
M̂ (called the extractor for M ) that runs on input U, aux, r in time TM̂ and outputs Ẑ ∈ G
or Ẑ = ⊥ such that
• For all U, aux, r, if M̂ (U, aux, r) = Ẑ 6= ⊥ then Ẑ = DH(U, Z)
• For every probabilistic Turing Machine C running in time TG we have that

P rob[C(U, r, aux) = DH(U, Z) | M̂ (U, aux, r) = ⊥] ≤ εG

where Z = M (U, aux, r) and the probability is taken over the coin tosses of C and uniform
distribution on (U, r).
The first condition6 says that if the extractor outputs a group element, this element must
be DH(U, Z). The second condition says that no machine can succeed to compute DH(U, Z)
with non-negligible probability over the distribution of triples (U, aux, r) where M̂ outputs
⊥.
As said, the KDH assumption can be seen as a strengthening of KEA. In Section 3.9
we show how the combination of KEA with another natural knowledge assumption, “knowledge of discrete log” (KDL), implies KDH. Thus, protocols proven deniable under KDH are
deniable under KEA+KDL, providing more confidence on the deniability proof.
6

This can be relaxed to allow a negligible set of (U, r) values where the condition does
not hold.
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We now show that KDH implies the deniability of HMQV if the simulator can extract
the incriminating partys (Bob in our examples) private key, for example via key registration
as discussed in Section 3.1.4. In Section 3.8 we remove the need for this extraction condition
using a mild generalization of KDH.
Theorem 3.6.4. Under the (TM , TM̂ , TG , εG )-KDH Assumption, HMQV with Key Registration is a (T̃M , T̃M̂ , T̃G , εG ) deniable AKE in the random oracle model.
Proof. We consider deniability for the initiator against a possibly malicious responder. The
case of deniability for the responder against a possibly malicious initiator is dealt similarly.
We build a simulator SIM which on input the public key A of Alice (but not her secret
key a), interacts with a possibly malicious Bob and outputs a view that is indistinguishable
from the real one. Again we assume that long-term keys are registered and therefore the
simulator knows b, the secret key of Bob.
SIM chooses x ← Zq and computes X = g x . At this point the value d is determined in
the HMQV protocol. Bob receives X and outputs Y = g y (which determines the value e).
Note that Bob can be seen as a machine M in the definition of the KDHA: it runs on input
U = A and some auxiliary information aux which includes X. Therefore under the KDHA
there must be an extractor B̂ for Bob.
Remember that the real key of the HMQV protocol is defined as K = H[(XAd )y+be ]
where H is a random oracle. The simulator can easily compute (XAd )be since it knows b.
To compute (XAd )y it invokes B̂.
• If B̂ outputs Ẑ = DH(A, Y ) then SIM sets the key to H[Y x Ẑ d (XAd )be ], i.e. the real
key.
• If B̂ outputs ⊥ then SIM sets the key to K ← {0, 1}n where n is the length of the
session key.
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Note that in the second case, any judge running in time less than TG will not be able to
compute DH(A, Y ) and therefore will not be able to query the random oracle in the preimage
of the real key. This immediately yields that for this judge a random key is indistinguishable
from the real key.
For the case of 3DH the Key Registration step is not necessary since the value g ab (the
Diffie-Hellman transform of the long-term secret keys) is not included in the session key.
Theorem 3.6.5. Under the (TM , TM̂ , TG , εG ) KDHA, 3DH is a (T̃M , T̃M̂ , T̃G , εG ) deniable
AKE in the random oracle model.
Proof. We consider deniability for the initiator against a possibly malicious responder. The
case of deniability for the responder against a possibly malicious initiator is dealt similarly.
We build a simulator SIM which on input the public key A of Alice (but not her secret
key a), interacts with a possibly malicious Bob and outputs a view that is indistinguishable
from the real one.
SIM chooses x ← Zq and computes X = g x . Bob receives X and outputs Y = g y . Note
that Bob can be seen as a machine M in the definition of the KDHA: it runs on input U = A
and some auxiliary information aux which includes X. Therefore under the KDHA there
must be an extractor B̂ for Bob.
Remember that the real key of the 3DH protocol is defined as

K = H[DH(A, Y )||DH(X, Y )||DH(B, X)]

where H is a random oracle. The simulator can easily compute DH(X, Y ) and DH(B, X)
since it knows x. To compute DH(A, Y ) it invokes B̂.
• If B̂ outputs Ẑ = DH(A, Y ) then SIM sets the key to

K = H[Ẑ||DH(X, Y )||DH(B, X)]

CHAPTER 3. DENIABILITY ANALYSIS OF IAKE PROTOCOLS

63

i.e. the real key.
• If B̂ outputs ⊥ then SIM sets the key to K ← {0, 1}n where n is the length of the
session key.
Note that in the second case, any judge running in time less than TG will not be able to
compute DH(A, Y ) and therefore will not be able to query the random oracle in the preimage
of the real key. This immediately yields that for this judge a random key is indistinguishable
from the real key.

3.7

3DH vs Signal

In this section, we show that the deniability of 3DH (independently of the assumptions on
which such deniability can be proven) implies the deniability of X3DH and the full Signal
protocol. We do this by invoking Theorem 3.3.2 on the message flow of Signal.
We refer the reader to [20] for a full description of the Signal protocol and its security
analysis. Informally we can describe Signal as an initial AKE which establishes a root key,
followed by a secure session where messages are exchanged. However each message exchange
is accompanied by a ratcheting step, which generates new session key. These sequence of
keys, creates a key chain where keys are authenticated by their predecessor in the chain. In
a symmetric ratcheting step the current chain key K is fed to a KDF function to generate
two keys, the new chain key K1 and the key K2 used to encrypt/authenticate the message at
this round. In a asymmetric ratcheting the parties perform a new Diffie-Hellman exchange
over two ephemeral keys and feed the result to a KDF together with the current chain key,
also outputting K1 , K2 as above.
Note how in the above description, after the initial AKE which establishes a session
key K, the messages exchanged in the protocol do not use the long-term secret keys of the
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parties. Therefore if the initial AKE is deniable we can apply Theorem 3.3.2 and claim the
deniability of Signal.
The X3DH Protocol. If the initial AKE protocol in Signal were 3DH we would be done.
However to enable asynchronous communication (where Bob, the responder, could be offline
at the moment in which Alice, the initiator, sends him a message), the Signal protocol uses
the X3DH variant of 3DH. This variant allows Bob to load his ephemeral key Y onto a key
distribution server (a pre-key in Signal jargon). To prevent impersonation attacks by the
server, Bob will sign Y with his long term secret key. When Alice wants to talk to Bob she
queries the key distribution server for Bob’s ephemeral key and runs the 3DH protocol to
establish a root chain key K1 and a message key K2 used to secure the first message she
sends to Bob. At this point Alice and Bob will continue with the ratcheting mechanism
described above. We now move to establish the deniability of X3DH.
It is not hard to see that the proof of deniability of 3DH extends to X3DH in the case
of the initiator. Indeed, the deniability argument for Alice in X3DH is the same as for
the responder in 3DH since here Alice acts on the ephemeral value Y chosen by Bob. In
contrast, deniability with respect to Bob in X3DH is complicated by the fact that Bob signs
the value Y . But note that Bob places Y and its signature on a public server that anyone
can access. Thus, Y is not bound to any specific peer, and cannot be used as a proof that
Bob communicated with anyone.
Formally, we can consider Y and its signature as auxiliary information that an adversarial
Alice has when initiating the protocol, and can therefore be provided to the simulator as
well. While this is the intuition behind the simulation argument, there is another technical
twist at this point. In the 3DH simulation of Bob against a malicious Alice, the simulator
is allowed to choose y ← Zq and set Y = g y ; the knowledge of y helps the simulator in the
computation of the correct key. In the X3DH simulation, however, Y is part of the auxiliary
input and the simulator has no access to y. Intuitively, because Bob signs Y , the latter can
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be seen as another public key associated with him and the simulator cannot be given its
secret key.
The problem boils down to the computation of g xy . In the 3DH simulation, we simply
computed it through the knowledge of y. Here, we need to extract it from Alice, and this
requires an additional assumption that says we can extract both g xy and g bx .
Definition 3.7.1. Let G be a cyclic group and AUX a class of auxiliary inputs. Let M be
a probabilistic Turing Machine running in time TM which runs on input (U, W, aux) where
U, W ← G, and aux ∈ AUX, and outputs Z ∈ G; we denote with Z = M (U, W, aux, r) the
output of running M on input U, W, aux with coin tosses r.
We say that the (TM , TM̂ , TG , εG ) Knowledge of 2DH (K2DH) Assumption holds over
group G and class AUX, if for every such M , there exists a companion probabilistic Turing
Machine M̂ (called the extractor for M ) such that: M̂ runs on input U, W, aux, r in time
TM̂ and outputs Ẑ1 , Ẑ2 ∈ G or ⊥ such that
• If M̂ (U, W, aux, r) 6= ⊥ then Ẑ1 = DH(U, Z) and Ẑ2 = DH(W, Z)
• If M̂ (U, W, aux, r) = ⊥ then for every probabilistic Turing Machine C running in time
TG we have that

P rob[C(U, W, Z, r, aux) ∈ {DH(U, Z), DH(W, Z)} | M̂ (U, W, aux, r) = ⊥] ≤ εG

where Z = M (U, W, aux, r) and the probability is taken over the coin tosses of C and uniform
distribution on (U, W, r).
The reliance of the following theorem on extractability of the private key via Key Registration is removed in Section 3.8.
Theorem 3.7.2. Under the (TM , TM̂ , TG , εG ) K2DHA, X3DH with Key Registration is a
(T̃M , T̃M̂ , T̃G , εG ) deniable AKE in the random oracle model.
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Proof. Deniability for the initiator follows the same structure as Theorem 3.6.5. We now
consider deniability for the responder against a possibly malicious initiator.
We build a simulator SIM which on input the long-term public key B of Bob and his signed
pre-key Y, sig (but not the matching secret keys b, y), interacts with a possibly malicious Alice
and outputs a view that is indistinguishable from the real one. We assume that SIM knows
a (the long-term secret key of Alice) due to key registration.
SIM receives X from Alice, and Y, sig from the server. Let Â be the extractor associated
with Alice (running on input U = B, W = Y and Z = X) guaranteed by the K2DHA.
Remember that the real key of the X3DH protocol is defined as

K = H[DH(A, Y )||DH(X, Y )||DH(B, X)]

where H is a random oracle. Note that the simulator knows DH(A, Y ) since it knows a. The
simulator invokes Â. If the extractor outputs ⊥ at any of the invocations, then the simulator
outputs a random session key (which under the K2DHA is indistinguishable from the real
one in the random oracle model). Otherwise the output of Â is Ẑ1 = DH(U, Z) = DH(B, X)
and Ẑ2 = DH(W, Z) = DH(X, Y ) and therefore the simulator has all the values to compute
the correct session key.

3.8

On the need to extract the long-term private keys

The simulation arguments of Theorems 3.6.4 and 3.7.2 assume the ability to extract the
incriminating party’s (Bob in our examples) private key, for example via key registration.
This simplified the proofs and intuition. We note however that such extraction is not essential. Instead, we can generalize our extraction assumptions to prevent Bob from sampling
either B or Y in a way that he does not know the discrete logs and yet both g ab and g ay are
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distinguishable from random. Indeed, what happens (in either HMQV, 3DH and X3DH) is
that Bob will be able to incriminate Alice if (and only if) he is able to sample either B or
Y under the above conditions. Formally, we achieve this by adding one extra “knowledge”
assumption about the way parties generate their long-term keys; arguably, this additional
assumption is not essentially stronger than the previous ones. Details follow.
Definition 3.8.1. Let G be a cyclic group and AUX a class of auxiliary inputs. Let M be
a probabilistic Turing Machine running in time TM which runs on input aux ∈ AUX, and
outputs Z ∈ G; we denote with Z = M (aux, r) the output of running M on input aux with
coin tosses r.
We say that the (TM , TM̂ , TG , εG ) Extended Knowledge of DH (EKDH) Assumption holds
over group G and class AUX, if for every such M , there exists a companion probabilistic
Turing Machine M̂ (called the extractor for M ) such that: M̂ runs on input aux, r and an
additional input U ∈ G, in time TM̂ and outputs Ẑ or ⊥ such that
• If M̂ (U, aux, r) = Ẑ 6= ⊥ then Ẑ = DH(U, Z)
• If M̂ (U, aux, r) = ⊥ then for every probabilistic Turing Machine C running in time TG
we have that

P rob[C(U, r, aux) = DH(U, Z) | M̂ (aux, r) = ⊥] ≤ εG

where Z = M (aux, r) and the probability is taken over the coin tosses of C and uniform
distribution on r.
Note the difference between the KDH and the EKDH Assumption. In the latter, the
group element U ∈ G is not known to the machine M , but is fed to the extractor as input.
This is because we need to model a machine M that generates Z as its long-term public key
before seeing any of the keys of the parties it will interact with.
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Theorem 3.8.2. Under the (TM , TM̂ , TG , εG ) EKDHA, HMQV protocol is (T̃M , T̃M̂ , T̃G , εG )
deniable AKE in the random oracle model, even without registration of long-term public keys.
Proof. The proof for the deniability with respect to initiator follows closely the proof of
Theorem 3.6.4.
For the case of the responder, recall that the session key is defined as K = H[(XAd )y+be ].
The simulator computes Y x+ad = (XAd )y since it knows y such that Y = g y . It computes
(B e )x+ad by invoking the extractor Â twice under the EKDHA. Recall that Alice output the
public key A = g a , therefore the extractor Â on input B de will output either B ade or ⊥.
Similarly, after Alice sends X = g x we can invoke Â on input B e to get either B ex or ⊥. If
either output is ⊥ the simulator outputs a random session key, otherwise it has extracted
the correct key.
A similar theorem holds for X3DH.

3.9

Knowledge of Discrete Log Assumption

In Section 3.6.2 we introduced the Knowledge of Diffie-Hellman (KDH) assumption that
forms the basis for the proof of deniability of the protocols considered in this paper. As
explained there, KDH can be seen as a strengthening of the well-known Knowledge of Exponent Assumption (KEA). Here, we shed further light on the relation between KEA and
KDH by introducing another knowledge assumption, Knowledge of Discrete Log (KDL), and
showing that KDH is implied by the conjunction of KEA and KDL. In particular, it means
that these two assumptions, taken together, suffice for our proofs of deniability. Arguably,
the KDL is a natural knowledge assumption very much in the style of KEA and possibly
more appealing than KDH.
We start by providing a formal definition of KEA (with auxiliary input) [22, 39, 5].
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Definition 3.9.1. Let G be a cyclic group of order q generated by element g and AU X be
a class of auxiliary inputs. Let M be a probabilistic Turing Machine that receives as input
pairs (g, g u ), aux ∈ AU X and random coins r, and outputs a pair of elements in G, which
we denote by (V, W ) = M (g, g u , aux, r).
We say that (T, T̄ , εKEA )-Knowledge of Exponent Assumption (KEA) with AU X holds
over group G with respect to generator g if for every machine M as above running in time
T , there exists a probabilistic Turing Machine M̄ that runs in time T̄ on the same inputs
and coins as M and outputs an element in Zp such that the following holds:
P rob[M (g, g u , aux, r) = (V, W = V u ) and M̄ (g, g u , aux, r) 6= dlogg (V )] < εKEA ,

where the probability is over the uniform choice of u ← Zq and the random coins r of M .
Note: When the value of g is clear from the context we omit it as subscript to dlog; and
sometimes omit it as input to machines M and M̄ .
KEA captures the intuition that if a machine, on input (g, g u ), can sample a value Z ∈ G
for which it can produce a pair (Z, Z u ) then it has enough “internal knowledge” to also
produce z = dlog(Z). More generally, one can consider machines that sample elements Z in
G and ask whether the internal processing that leads to sampling Z has enough information
to extract z = dlog(Z). In more detail, consider a process that samples elements from a cyclic
group of order q, generated by an element g. For example, the sampler could use its random
coins r to choose an exponent y ∈ Zq and output Y = g y or it could hash r into a random
group element in a way that y = dlog(Y ) is hard to compute. In the first case, examining
the internal computation one can extract y while in the latter one cannot. We introduce
Knowledge of Discrete Log (KDL) Assumption, which says that, similarly to KEA, if in the
process of generating Y ∈ G there is enough information to extract y = dlog(Y ), then there
is an extractor that running on the same coins as the sampler outputs y. Furthermore, such
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extractor is “maximal” in the sense that on inputs it fails to output y, other machines will
fail too.
We now formalize the KDL Assumption and show that together with KEA, it implies
the KDH assumptions, and therefore together they imply deniability of HMQV and 3DH.
Definition 3.9.2. Let G be a finite cyclic group generated by an element g of order q.
Consider a probabilistic Turing Machine M with inputs in some set S, such that for any
s ∈ S and random coins r ∈ {0, 1}` (for some ` ∈ Z+ ), M outputs an element M (s, r) = Y
in G. We call such a machine a G-sampler.
A probabilistic Turing Machine M 0 is called a dlog extractor for the G-sampler M , if for
every r, s, M 0 (s, r) outputs dlog(Y ) or ⊥.
A machine M 0 is called a (T, T 0 , Tmax , εmax )-maximal dlog extractor for a G-sampler M ,
if it satisfies the following:
• The running time of M and M 0 are bounded by T and T 0 , respectively.
• For all r ∈ {0, 1}` and s ∈ S, if M 0 (s, r) 6= ⊥ then M 0 (s, r) = dlog(M (s, r)).
• For every probabilistic Turing Machine C running in time Tmax and for all s ∈ S,
P robC,r [C(s, r) = dlog(M (s, r))] < P robM 0 ,r [M 0 (s, r) = dlog(M (s, r))] + εmax

where probabilities are taken over coin tosses of the machines C and M 0 and the
uniform distribution over values r.
Definition 3.9.3. Let G be a cyclic group of order q, generated by element g. We say
that (T, T 0 , Tmax , εmax )-Knowledge of Discrete Log (KDL) Assumption holds over group G, if
every G-sampler running in time at most T has a (T, T 0 , Tmax , εmax )-maximal dlog extractor.
As a reminder, in the following theorem when t is the running time of an algorithm, the
notation t̃ denotes t plus a constant number of exponentiations in G.
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Theorem 3.9.4. Let G be a cyclic group of order q, generated by element g and AU X be a
class of auxiliary inputs. If the (TKEA , T̄KEA , εKEA )-KEA with AUX and the (T, T 0 , TKDL , εKDL )KDL assumptions hold over G, then the (T, T̃ 0 , T̄KEA ,
εKDL + εKEA )-KDH holds over G and AU X.
Proof. Let M be a probabilistic Turing Machine running on input U, aux, r and outputting
M (U, aux, r) = Z ∈ G. We show that the KEA and KDL assumptions imply the existence
of a KDH extractor for M as postulated by the KDH assumption.
We view machine M as a G-sampler, which receives a (U ||aux, r) input and outputs a
group element Z. Let’s assume that M runs in time T . By KDL assumption, there is a
(T, T 0 , TKDL , εKDL )-maximal dlog extractor M 0 for M . We build a KDH extractor M̂ using
M 0 as follows.
M̂ (U, aux, r)
run M 0 (U ||aux, r) = α
if α = dlog(Z)
return U α
else
return ⊥

Note that when M 0 returns dlog(Z), M̂ returns DH(U, Z) and otherwise it returns ⊥.
Thus, M̂ acts as a KDH extractor, whose running time is bounded by T 0 plus an exponentiation in G, hence T̃ 0 . We need to show that M̂ satisfies the condition in KDH. Informally,
that if there is a way to compute DH(U, Z) from the inputs (U, aux, r), then M̂ will compute
it.
Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists a probabilistic Turing Machine C which
whose success probability is greater than ε = εKEA + εKDL over the set of inputs where
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M̂ fails, i.e., returns ⊥. Let Ψ denote the distribution over pairs of (U, r) conditioned on
M̂ (U, aux, r) = ⊥. Explicitly, the probability weight assigned to (U0 , r0 ) by Ψ is that:

Ψ(U0 , r0 ) =

P robM̂ [M̂ (U0 , aux, r0 ) = ⊥]
Σ(U,r) P robM̂ [M̂ (U, aux, r) = ⊥]

,

where the machine name in the subscript denotes the random coins of the machine. We
assume that

P rob [C(U, aux, r) = DH(U, Z)] > ε.

(3.1)

C,(U,r)←Ψ

We define a probabilistic machine µ that runs on a set of inputs (U, aux, r) as defined for
machines M and C above. For each such input, µ runs M and C and outputs a pair (Z, γ)
where γ is either DH(U, Z) or ⊥ or another value.
µ(U, aux, r)
run M (U ||aux, r) = Z
run M 0 (U ||aux, r) = β
if β 6= ⊥,
set γ to U β
else
set γ to C(U, aux, r)
return (Z, γ)

By KEA, there exists an extractor µ̄ that receives the same input as µ and, except with
probability at most εKEA , it returns dlog(Z) whenever the output of µ is (Z, DH(U, Z))
which happens either when M 0 successfully extracts (β = dlog(Z), or when M 0 fails and C
succeeds in computing γ = DH(U, Z).
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We claim that if the assumption (3.1) on C holds, then µ̄ violates the maximality of the
dlog extractor M 0 .
For simplicity in notation, assume that event A indicates µ(U, aux, r) = (Z, DH(U, Z))
and event B indicates µ̄(U, aux, r) = dlog(Z). Negation of an event is denoted by ¬ symbol.

P rob [B] ≥ P rob [B ∧ A]
= P rob [B|A] P rob [A]
= (1 − P rob [¬B|A]) P rob [A]
= P rob [A] − P rob [¬B|A] P rob[A]
= P rob [A] − P rob [¬B ∧ A]
> P rob [A] − εKEA

(3.2)

First, note that the inequality (3.2) is implied by KEA. Using the inequality (3.2) and
the definition of µ, we can conclude the following. U denotes the uniform distribution over
the corresponding space and C in the subscript denotes the random coins of the machine C.

P rob [µ̄(U, aux, r) = dlog(Z)]
(U,r)←U

> P rob [µ(U, aux, r) = (Z, DH(U, Z))] − εKEA

(3.3)

(U,r)←U

= P rob [M 0 (U ||aux, r) = dlog(Z)] +
r←U

P rob [C(U, aux, r) = DH(U, Z) ∧ M 0 (U ||aux, r) = ⊥] − εKEA

(3.4)

C,(U,r)←U

> P rob [M 0 (U ||aux, r) = dlog(Z)] +
r←U

P rob [C(U, aux, r) = DH(U, Z) | M 0 (U ||aux, r) = ⊥] − εKEA

C,(U,r)←U

= P rob [M 0 (U ||aux, r) = dlog(Z)] +
r←U

(3.5)
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(3.6)

C,(U,r)←U

= P rob [M 0 (U ||aux, r) = dlog(Z)] +
r←U

P rob [C(U, aux, r) = DH(U, Z)] − εKEA

(3.7)

C,(U,r)←Ψ

> P rob [M 0 (U ||aux, r) = dlog(Z)] + εKDL
r←U

(3.8)

In the above, line (3.3) is the repeat of inequality (3.2). The expression in (3.4) is due
to the construction of µ and (3.5) follows from the conditional probability. In the line (3.6),
we move from M 0 to M̂ in the conditional part, this is due to the definition of M̂ . Equation
(3.7) comes from the definition of the KDH assumption. Line (3.8) is due to the assumption
made in (3.1) and by setting ε = εKEA + εKDL , as assumed.
Finally, we note that if we restrict the output of machine µ to its first element, namely the
output of M , we get that µ̄ acts as a KDL-extractor for M . However, the above inequality
shows that µ̄ breaks the assumed maximality of M 0 as a KDL extractor.
The runtime and success probability of the machine C set the third and fourth parameters
of KDH. The bound on the runtime of C comes from the construction of µ:

TKEA ≤ T + T 0 + runtime of C

The success probability that C outputs DH(U, Z) is at most ε = εKEA + εKDL . Therefore
the (T, T̃ 0 , T̄KEA , εKDL + εKEA )-KDH holds over group G and AU X.

Chapter 4
Corollaries and Observations
4.1

Deniability Analysis of OAKE Protocol Family

Yao et. al. introduced a family of key exchange protocols named OAKE, in a series of
papers [81, 80]. OAKE protocols are implicitly authenticated Diffie-Hellman with the communication complexity is identical to the unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman (See Figure 1.1).
Deniability is one of the design aims for OAKE protocols.
The authors aimed for Honest Player deniability for the OAKE family, which is equivalent
to the deniable key exchange assuming the protocol participants are acting honest. In this
concept, the threat for the deniability comes from outsiders. An outsider adversary may be
an eavesdropper on the communication channel, or an active adversary which may gather
information from communicating parties by attempting incomplete sessions or interfering
with the initiated sessions.
Note that with honest players, deniability simulation for iAKE protocols is quite simple.
The session key will be a function of the transcript (A,B,X,Y) and simulator can make use
DDH assumption to simulate any of the DH value g ab , g ay , g bx , g xy with a random value.
(However in the presence of an adversarial party, simulator cannot have a choice of using
75
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DDH due to the fact that one DH component will be chosen adversarially which leads DDH
to be inapplicable.) In case a random oracle is applied at the end to the key material, any
random value suffices to simulate the session key. So all the challenge lies in simulating the
transcript, if any.
Though, notice that, such a simulation strategy results in a computationally indistinguishable simulation. To ensure forward deniability, the authors sought statistical or perfect
simulation (following a finding in [26] that forward deniability is implied by a statistical
deniability simulation).
Yao et. al. analyzed the OAKE protocols on the basis of HP-deniability and forward
deniability. The question of whether these protocols satisfy regular offline deniability was
open. In this section, we are going to show that OAKE protocols are deniable under KDH
assumption with the key registration. In the absence of key registration, T-OAKE requires
EKDH for deniability while KDH is sufficient for the remaining versions in the random oracle
model.
OAKE family includes four versions, all have the same communication. They only differ
in the key computation: the coefficients that are used with the DH exponents differ though in
every version coefficients are all computable on the public values (public keys and identities).
In terms of deniability, main difference stems from the existence of a factor g ab in the session
key. We are going to analyse two types of these protocols, one (T-OAKE) with g ab factor
and the other (basic OAKE) without g ab in the session key. Their analysis will be sufficient
to sketch the proof for the other variants.

4.1.1

OAKE and T-OAKE Protocols

OAKE and T-OAKE protocols are pretty similar to 3DH and HMQV, respectively, in terms
of deniability characters. As seen in Figure 4.1, OAKE protocol has three DH values in
key computation g ay , g bx and g xy , while T-OAKE additionally has g ab . The protocols are

CHAPTER 4. COROLLARIES AND OBSERVATIONS

77

OAKE and T-OAKE
Alice
(a, A = g a )

Bob
(b, B = g b )
Â, A, X = g x
-

B̂, B, Y = g y


OAKE:
T-OAKE:

K = H(g ay g bx g xye ),
K = H(g ab g ay g bx g xye ),

H(·) and h(·) are a suitable hash functions and
e = h(Â, A, B̂, B, X, Y ).
Figure 4.1: OAKE and T-OAKE protocols with session key K
designed in ROM, both functions h and H are random oracles. Regarding key registration,
it is noted in [80] that they assume a PKI where no proof-of-knowledge or proof-of-possession
is executed by the CA for the long term keys. CA only checks the public keys for sub-group
membership, to make sure they are sampled from the correct algebraic group. This operation
does not require knowledge of the secret key to perform. As a result, we assume that the
deniability simulator is unable to extract the adversary’s long-term secret key.
As a side note, both protocols are concurrently deniable with key registration under the
KDH assumption in the random oracle model. If we lift the key registration requirement,
OAKE is deniable under KDH and T-OAKE is deniable under EKDH assumption in the
random oracle model.
The fact that T-OAKE requires EKDH (which is possibly stronger than KDH) is due
to the inclusion of g ab in the session key. When we assume no key registration (so that the
long-term secret of the adversary cannot be extracted by the simulator) and the session key
includes the DH value g ab of long-term keys A = g a and B = g b , KDH usually is not sufficient
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to extract g ab . Because KDH assumes that, following the notation in Definition 3.6.3 KDH,
the group member U is available at the time of sampling Z. In order to extract g ab , the
parameters U and Z must be set to A and B, (in certain order depending on which party
we simulate). However, we cannot assume that Alice’s key was available to Bob while Bob
is sampling his long-term key, or vice versa. This fact leads us to use EKDH for extracting
g ab when key registration is out of the picture.
Theorem 4.1.1. Under the (TM , TM̂ , TG , εG )-KDH Assumption, OAKE is a (T̃M , T̃M̂ , T̃G , εG )
deniable AKE in the random oracle model, even without registration of long-term public keys.
Proof. Consider deniability for the initiator Alice against a malicious responder Bob. We
build a simulator which runs on input Alice’s public key A, some random coins, auxiliary
information aux available to the adversary and eventually generates an output simulating
Bob’s view, which consists of Bob’s random coins, aux, the transcript Â, B̂, A, B, X, Y and
the session key K. Again, the sole challenge for simulation is computing the session key.
Since we assume no key registration SIM is not provided with Bob’s long-term secret b.
The simulator SIM activates Bob’s machine by inputting aux and random coins r. Then
it chooses x ← Zq and computes X = g x . Bob receives idA , A, X from SIM, and outputs
idB , B, Y . Note that, Bob can be seen as a machine M in the definition of KDH assumption
(Definition 3.6.3): it runs on input U = A, some auxiliary information aux||idA ||X and coins
r. Therefore under KDH, there must be an extractor for Bob.
Remember that the session key of the OAKE protocol is defined as K = H(g ay g xye g bx ),
where H is a random oracle and e is a coefficient computed on the transcript Â, B̂, A, B, X, Y .
The simulator can easily compute g xye and g bx with the knowledge of x. In order to compute
g ay , it invokes the KDH extractor.
• If the extractor outputs Ẑ = DH(A, Y ) then SIM sets the key to K = H(Ẑg xye g bx ),
which is the real key.
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• If the extractor outputs ⊥ then SIM sets the key to K ← {0, 1}n where n is the length
of the session key.
Note that in the second case, any judge running in time less than TG will not be able to
compute DH(A, Y ) and therefore will not be able to query the random oracle in the preimage
of the real key. This immediately yields that for this judge a random key is indistinguishable
from the real key.
For the deniability with respect to Bob, the proof goes along the same lines. The simulator
computes two DH values of the session key g ay and g xye by using y, which it chooses by itself.
Then it invokes the KDH extractor to compute the third value g bx , with the parameters
U = B and Z = X. Because Bob’s long-term key B is fixed before X is sampled, the
extractor can be executed by setting U = B. The simulation of the session key is identical
to the proof above.
T-OAKE Protocol. T-OAKE protocol is similar to HMQV in that both protocols involve
g ab in the session key, which adds another layer of complexity to the deniability simulation,
especially when the adversary’s long-term secret is not accessible for extraction during key
registration. Note that HMQV with key registration is deniable (Theorem 3.6.4) under KDH,
while it is deniable without key registration under EKDH (Theorem 3.8.2). Both results are
shown to hold in the random oracle model. The proof for T-OAKE follows closely the proof
of Theorem 3.8.2 except for the way the session key is computed.
Theorem 4.1.2. Under the (TM , TM̂ , TG , εG )-EKDH Assumption, T-OAKE is a (T̃M , T̃M̂ , T̃G , εG )
deniable AKE in the random oracle model, even without registration of long-term public keys.
Proof. Recall that the session key of T-OAKE is defined as K = H(g ab g ay g xye g bx ).
Consider the initiator’s deniability, in which the simulator SIM takes on the role of Alice.
The simulator is able to compute g xye g bx since it knows x such that X = g x . It computes
g ab and g ay by invoking the extractor twice under the EKDH assumption.
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The first extraction occurs after Bob outputs his public key B = g b . In accordance with
the notation of the EKDH assumption in Definition ??ekdh, the first extraction is performed
on the parameters Z = B and U = A. As a result, the extractor returns either Ab or ⊥.
The second extraction occurs after Bob sends Y = g y . SIM can invoke the EKDH
assumption with parameters Z = Y and U = A to obtain either Ay or ⊥. If either output is
⊥ the simulator outputs a random session key, otherwise it has extracted the correct key.
Note that KDH assumption suffices for the second extraction, too, since A is fixed by the
time Y is sampled by the adversary.
Deniability for the responder follows along the same lines: two extractions are necessary,
one for simulating g ab and another for g bx . Similarly, g bx can be obtained by KDH, too.

4.2

Deniability of iAKE protocols combined with Key
Confirmation

4.2.1

HMQV with Key Confirmation

Figure 4.2 shows the HMQV protocol with key confirmation, as introduced in [52].
Theorem 4.2.1. HMQV-C protocol is concurrently deniable with respect to the initiator in
the random oracle model under the Knowledge of Exponent Assumption with auxiliary input
(Definition 3.9.1) even without registration of long-term public keys.
Proof. We build a simulator SIM which, on input the public key A of Alice, interacts with
a malicious peer Bob, and outputs a simulation of the view of Bob, that is indistinguishable
from the real one with respect to any efficient judge.
SIM activates the adversary’s machine (Bob) by feeding into random coins r and auxiliary
input aux.
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HMQV-C
Public Input: A = g a , B = g b public keys of Alice and Bob respectively.
Secret Input of Alice: a; Secret Input of Bob: b;
Alice

Bob

x ← {1, . . . , q}
X = gx

idAlice , idBob , X
-

idBob , idAlice , Y, tB


K̃ = (Y B e )x+da
(Km , Ks ) = H(K̃)
if tB is correct
tA = M ACKm (“0)
output Ks
else output ⊥

tA
-

y ← {1, . . . , q}
Y = gy
K̃ = (XAd )y+eb
(Km , Ks ) = H(K̃)
tB = M ACKm (“1)
if tA is correct
output Ks
else output ⊥

d = h(X, idBob ), e = h(Y, idAlice ),
h(·) and H(·) are random oracles.
Figure 4.2: HMQV protocol with key confirmation [52].
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SIM chooses x ← Zq at random and computes X = g x . After receiving A and X from
SIM, Bob may query the random oracle to compute the MAC key and eventually outputs
B, Y and tB . Let us denote the input-output pairs of Bob’s RO queries as (αi , βi ), such that
βi = RO(αi ) for the i’th query. The simulator monitors these queries but is not able to
modify them (program the oracle).
A careful look at the input-output of Bob makes it clear that we can invoke KEA with
aux on Bob in order to extract (be + y), provided that Bob computes it.
Remember that an (honest) responder receives A, X, r, aux and a group generator g as
input, queries the random oracle on K̃ = (Ad X)be+y and then outputs B, Y, tB . We can
define a sequence of machines to show that the responder can be viewed as a machine which
outputs g be+y , (Ad X)be+y on input g, (Ad X), r, aux. Hence, there will be a KEA extractor
returning (be + y).
Let us define the sequence of machines as follows. Assume that there is a machine
µ1 enclosing Bob, receiving A, X, aux, r, g as input and invokes another machine µ2 inside,
which is also enclosing Bob. On input (g, Ad X, r, aux0 ), with aux0 = aux||A, X, µ2 runs Bob
on g, A, X, r, aux. After a series of RO queries {(αi , βi )}i , Bob outputs B, Y and tB . The
machine µ2 outputs (B e Y, (Ad X)be+y , aux00 ), where aux00 = (B, Y, tB ). Finally µ1 returns
B, Y, tB as specified by the protocol. The runtimes of these machines differ by a constant
number of operations. KEA with auxiliary input can be invoked on µ2 to extract (be + y).
The simulation continues according to Bob’s queries and the output of the extractor,
following one of the cases below.
If Bob outputs his round message without making any RO query, then SIM aborts the
session and sets the session key to ⊥ in the simulation output (Case 1). Otherwise, SIM runs
the KEA extractor which returns γ. SIM verifies the result by checking whether g γ = B e Y .
If correct, SIM sets K̃ to (Ad X)γ and follows the specified protocol (Case 2). If g γ 6= B e Y ,
SIM aborts the session and sets the session key Ks = ⊥ in the simulation output (Case 3).
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At the end of the simulation, SIM returns (A, B, X, Y, tA , tB , Ks , r, aux), by setting the
value of tA = ⊥ whenever it aborts before the final round.
Note that unless Bob queries the RO on DH(Ad X, B e Y ), there is no way that Bob knows
the real MAC key Km (corresponding to A, B, X, Y ) beside guessing it right or finding the
value within aux.
In order to eliminate the possibility that Bob sends a valid tB without querying the RO,
we may set out the simulator to choose x such that no tuple (A, B, X, ·) appears in aux for
X = gx.
In Case 1, SIM outputs (A, B, X, Y, tA = ⊥, tB , Ks = ⊥, r, aux). Note that the simulation
differs from a real conversation in this case only when tB is computed correctly. (When tB
is assigned an incorrect value, the initiator is expected to abort, just as SIM does.) The
probability that Bob sends out a correct MAC tag tB without querying the random oracle
is exponentially small in the order of the group G. Therefore the probability of failure for
the simulation is negligible in Case 1.
In cases 2 and 3, Bob sends B, Y, tB after querying the random oracle. The KEA extractor for Bob returns γ, which can be verified for correctness by SIM. A valid γ value
results in a perfect simulation in Case 2. However, an invalid γ may appear (Case 3) as a
consequence of an extractor failure or Bob’s not querying the RO on the real Diffie-Hellman
value DH(Ad X, B e Y ).
In Case 3, SIM outputs (A, B, X, Y, tA = ⊥, tB , Ks = ⊥, r, aux) and it differs from a real
conversation only when Bob sends the correct tB but KEA extractor fails. Extractor failure
happens with probability at most εKEA and Bob is able to guess the correct tB with an
exponentially small probability in the order of the group G.
We have shown that the judge, as an outsider, can detect the above simulation only with
εKEA + a negligible probability.
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Deniability for Responder in HMQV-C.
For the responder’s deniability, KEA in the random oracle model is not sufficient for HMQVC, regardless of key registration. Consider the deniability simulator in the role of Bob. After
receiving A and X from the adversary Alice, SIM is expected to output the MAC tB . With key
registration, SIM needs assistance with computing g bx , without key registration computing
both g bx and g ab is challenging. Since the only value Alice outputs at this point is X, KEA or
Key-Awareness [28] assumptions are not useful. We find ourselves at the same situation with
regular HMQV, therefore we need to resort to KDH assumption (assuming key registration)
or EKDH assumption (without key registration).
Since computation of MAC key involves not only ephemeral keys as in SIGMA, but also
the long-term keys, auxiliary information which involves transcripts from other sessions in
the network may not help either.
Attempts to mitigate the problem by adding a fourth step to the protocol are ineffective.
(Though the cost of the fourth round does not appear to be a realistic trade-off for stepping
down from KDH to KEA.) This attempt only shifts the center of the problem: Same situation
is experienced on the side of the initiator this time. As a result, we can conclude that HMQVC still requires KDH or EKDH to ensure responder’s deniability.
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Observations on Extractability, Obfuscation and
Time-Based Cryptography in relation to Deniability

4.3.1

Obfuscation and KDH Assumptions

The KDH assumption family that we use to prove our deniability results require that for
any adversary running the key exchange protocol, there exists an extractor that will yield
some internal state of the adversary. Here we briefly remark on how our assumptions differ
from the notion of extractable one-way function introduced in [10].
If F is an extractable one-way function, for every adversary A that outputs y = F (x),
there exists an extractor E that outputs x0 ∈ F −1 (y). The main result in [10] is that in the
case in which A and E have the same common auxiliary input, then extractable one-way functions do not exists, under the assumption of the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation
(iO) for certain classes of circuits. Given recent results [43] that establish the existence of iO
for any circuit under reasonable assumptions, then common-auxiliary extractable functions
should not be considered as a sound assumption.
We point out that deniability proofs based on knowledge extraction require the adversary
and the extractor to have a common auxiliary input (since the deniability simulator must be
a “real-life” simulator, which has the same “knowledge” as the adversary1 ). Therefore there
seems to be little hope to establish a deniability simulations based on extractable one-way
functions. This would seem to doom our approach.
Yet our assumptions are not equivalent to extractable one-way functions and indeed
require something weaker. Informally our extractor E will either output x0 ∈ F −1 (y) or fail,
1

The analogy is allowing the simulator to have the trapdoor associated with a common
reference string –while that is OK for zero-knowledge simulation, it does not provide a proof
of real-life plausible deniability.
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and in the latter case the assumption requires that it is easy to sample a distribution which
is computationally indistinguishable from F −1 (y). This in turns implies that our assumption
are not affected by the negative result in [10].

4.3.2

Obfuscation and Online Deniability Attacks to Signal

Inspecting the interaction between extractability and obfuscation has led us to interesting
examples worth considering further in the context of deniability. These examples are motivated by a desire to investigate to what extent the obfuscation and time-based cryptography
are useful for staging an attack similar to the “bad sampling strategy” described in Section
3.5.
We observe that, with the introduction of obfuscation into the setting, bad-sampling
strategy transforms into an online attack. Both obfuscation and time-lock puzzles (TLP)
are useful in staging online attacks for enabling an adversarial participant in a session to
prove her/his lack of knowledge of an ephemeral secret. Additionally, these tools eliminate
the need for a third party (judge) to be online during the protocol’s execution in order to
collude with the malicious party. Compared to the known online attack to Signal [75], these
examples may demonstrate a stronger impact in terms of number of parties to be convinced
and the time period for an assisting party must be online in order to break deniability.
Let us first present the attack scenarios and then discuss why we classify them as online
deniability attacks.
For the attack scenarios, consider a third party who offers online services for the purpose
of undermining deniability of a particular protocol, such as Signal. Let us call the third
party as Wikileaks. We assume that Wikileaks has its own digital signature keys.
Example 4.3.1 (Wikileaks commits and opens the commitment). Wikileaks commits
to a PRF key K everyday and opens the commitments 10 days later. Wikileaks gives access
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to PRFK (·) publicly, where anyone can query the oracle on a point x and receives P RFK (x)
in return. As a proof of use of this service, Wikileaks signs the result and also provides a
NIZK proof that output generated by PRFK (·). If a malicious user Alice wants to frame Bob,
she takes the newspaper NYT of the day and queries the Wikileaks’s PRF oracle, which uses
that day’s freshly committed key K. Alice uses the response P RFK (N Y T ) as her ephemeral
(Diffie-Hellman) public key X. After the commitments open Alice can prove that she does
not know her ephemeral secret, because she computed the ephemeral key through Wikileaks’s
PRF service.
Note that in order for this strategy to function as an attack, Alice must have a way to
demonstrate that the session key K corresponds to the protocol’s transcript (A, B, X, Y ).
What distinguishes it from the online attack for Signal in [75]? In the online attack,
the judge generates the proof, which convinces only the judge. In Example 1, now that
the evidence convinces everyone, i.e., anyone can verify Wikileaks’s signature on values and
NIZK proof to confirm that the interaction occurred. As long as the third party offers this
service, this will be an effective way to circumvent deniability.

Time-Lock Puzzles
Time-lock puzzles (TLP) are cryptographic objects which are designed to keep an information
hidden behind the lock of intractability of a hard problem. By tuning the difficulty of the
intractable problem, one can ensure that the hidden information will stay safe for a certain
amount of time T and it will be released only after a continuous computation power for time
T will be exerted on the puzzle to break the lock.
A basic example of TLP due to [67] works as follows.
The puzzle creator Alice wants to encrypt a message M with a TLP for a period of T
seconds. Alice first chooses a key K for an appropriate encryption system and encrypts M
under K: CM = EncK (M ) and then creates a TLP to hide the key K based on squre root
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modulo a composite n with an unknown factorization. That is, Alice chooses a composite
number n by randomly picking two large primes p and q.

n = pq

Then she picks a random a modulo n and encrypts K as
t

C K = K + a2

mod n,

where t is the number of squarings modulo n that takes at least time T from the solver.
Finally Alice outputs the puzzle (n, a, t, CM , CK ) and removes any other values p, q which
allows solving the puzzle in less than time T.
Note that, by the design of the TLP it must be infeasible to apply a brute-force search
on the puzzle to find out K in time shorter than T.
Example 4.3.2 (Wikileaks generates a time-lock puzzle). For the attack scenario,
assume there is an agent Wikileaks publicly offering access to the following oracle: Upon
an arbitrary value from the user, the oracle generates a pseudorandom string and uses it to
choose y ∈ G and random values (such as p, q, a) to generate a TLP. The oracle encrypts
y with the TLP and outputs Y = g y and the TLP tuple, both signed under Wikileaks’
signature. (Assume that a brute force search on Y takes longer time on average than solving
the puzzle.)
A malicious party Bob, willing to frame Alice, submits a publicly known text, NYT, to
the oracle as input and receives the corresponding Y and TLP tuple. Bob runs the protocol
with Alice by submitting Y as his ephemeral public key.
Using NYT as input, Bob is able to prove anyone that he does not know the ephemeral
secret y = log Y starting from the day of the newspaper and the following period of time T.
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Bob can also prove after solving the puzzle that the session key used in Alice’s messages is
the actual key.
Example 2 has the same advantages that Example 1 have over the original online attack.
Additionally, this time Wikileaks only needs to be online at the time of generating the puzzle
(rather than being online also at the time of opening the commitment).
Example 4.3.3 (Wikileaks generates an obfuscated oracle). Imagine that Wikileaks
obfuscates the oracle described in Example 2 and presents the obfuscated program to public
use. The oracle receives an arbitrary input and returns Y and time-lock puzzle, appended
with a signature.
Again, Bob can frame his peer Alice by choosing his ephemeral key as described in
Example 2. Unlike to the Example 2, this strategy permanently destroys (online) deniability.
It is sufficient to generate such a program once by a trusted party to break deniability once
and for all.

Conclusion. In order to claim that the above examples circumvent the deniability of the
relevant protocols, we need to place trust on Wikileaks, that Wikileaks will not collude with
Bob and reveal the concealed value y = log Y to him.
We introduced Wikileaks into the picture, because saying that “Bob uses an obfuscated
oracle or a time-lock puzzle for choosing his ephemeral key” leads us to the question that
who created this oracle, and do we trust the creator that hidden information is not shared
with Bob (i.e., creator colludes with Bob)?
Once a trusted party is added into the attack scenario, the setup appears pretty similar
to the online attack in [75]. The difference is that with the use of TLP and obfuscation,
the requirement for the judge to be online during the session has been relaxed to different
degrees.

Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Directions
Our study shows why a meaningful deniability proof for Signal may be difficult to construct.
We presented a constructive counterexample for the MQV protocol consisting of mathematical groups where running MQV results in a provably non-deniable interaction. This
MQV counter-example illuminates the core problems one encounters in trying to prove the
deniability of 3DH, the AKE underlying Signal.
We showed that a deniability proof for 3DH (and MQV and HMQV) can be built from
a strong “knowledge assumption” which seems to be inherently “tight”, as it is defined as
the logical negation of the strategy required for making this type of AKE non-deniable. On
the other hand, however, this assumption is almost tautological as it basically assumes the
existence of an extractor which is the required deniability simulator.
Our counter-examples and this problematic assumption and proof, underscores the need
to be critically re-examining our belief that Signal can be formally proven to be deniable,
and accepting instead that we are just assuming it is.
Our research is the first to examine the offline deniability of 2-message iAKE protocols
when malicious adversaries are present. The analysis revealed the counter-intuitive result
that, despite the fact that the iAKE protocols exchange minimal data between peers, a
90
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provable deniability required much stronger assumptions.
The communication content of the protocols addressed in this work contains only longterm and ephemeral public keys that are transmitted independently. If we attempt to add
confirmation step to these protocols or useencryption or signature in order to provide explicit
authentication, we will end up with protocols like SKEME, SIGMA and HMQV-C, whose
deniability is proven under weaker assumptions than the KDH family; such as key-awareness,
plaintext-awareness and KEA. This situation appears to be a consequence of the intricate
nature of deniability as a concept, which is orthogonal to authentication.
Many deniability proofs in the literature use a knowledge extractor and produce a perfect
or statistically indistinguishable simulation. The question that naturally arises is whether it
is possible to achieve deniability under weaker assumptions.
We attempted, in an unpublished effort, to modify these 2-message iAKE protocols with
a minimal means of achieving deniability under weaker assumptions. A ZK proof appears to
be a natural candidate for augmenting the protocol in order to prevent the attack wherein
a party can randomly sample its ephemeral key, in particular without knowing the corresponding secret value. This modification requires peers to demonstrate (in zero-knowledge)
that they possess the ephemeral secret value. In order to preserve the 2-message structure,
we preferred an NIZK proof. In addition, the resulting protocol can support asynchronous
communication because the message of the initiator can be made independent of the identity
of the responder.
In the simulation of deniability, we must extract the secret keys corresponding to the
ephemeral values without rewinding or programming the random oracle [61]. Therefore, we
must assume that only parties with knowledge of the secret value can generate correct NIZK
proofs. As with key- or plaintext-awareness, this can be modeled utilizing a companion
extractor machine. In other words, the presence of an NIZK proof still necessitates an
additional knowledge extraction assumption in order to successfully complete the simulation.
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Hashimoto et al. [42] presented a similar specific case in which they introduced a postquantum secure key exchange protocol that satisfies Signal’s essential characteristics, namely
asynchronous communication, 2-message round complexity, deniability, and forward secrecy.
The protocol is constructed with KEM and ring signatures, and it has been demonstrated
to be offline-deniable without any knowledge assumptions against only semi-honest adversaries (who are following the protocol honestly). To achieve deniability against malicious
adversaries, they modified this protocol by augmenting an NIZK proof to the protocol. The
resultant protocol has been proven to be deniable in this sense, assuming the KEM holds
the plaintext-awareness property.
It appears that with the iAKE protocols of the aforementioned Signal properties, knowledge extraction may be intrinsic to achieving deniability against malicious adversaries. Conversely, there are examples of key exchange protocols that provide stronger deniability assurances without relying on knowledge assumptions. These are the online deniable protocols
from [31, 78, 74, 75].Nonetheless, these protocols are susceptible to KCI attacks, a fact
also highlighted by [42]. Therefore, a security compromise may be inevitable as a result of
avoiding knowledge assumptions.
A natural open question in light of the preceding examples is whether a knowledge assumption is required for the iAKE protocol with the aforementioned properties. A stronger
statement, such as demonstrating that a non-black box technique is required for offline deniability simulations, could be a viable direction, as it may be possible to prove it using the
existing non-black box impossibility results from the literature.
The online attacks that are carried out with the aid of a third-party service are the
subject of an interesting discussion regarding Signal’s deniability. There are a few instances
in the literature that make use of various cryptographic objects, such as [31, 78] presenting an
example with append-only bulletin boards, [38] presenting a similar attack utilizing a trusted
execution environment and remote attestation service, and [75] presenting an instance in
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which the malicious protocol participant selectively discloses any part of the conversation
after the session. In Section 4.3.2, we present example attack strategies utilizing obfuscation
and time-lock puzzles.
Utilizing a third-party service to generate irrefutable logs of protocol communication in
real time is a characteristic shared by all these attacks. The credibility of the logs depends on
the trust placed in the third-party service, typically through the use of a signature. Creating
non-repudiable protocol records during the session appears to contradict the definition of offline deniability. Offline deniability is achieved by taking advantage of the fact that evidences
of participation in a communication session can be fabricated after the fact by exploiting
the knowledge/view gap between the judge and protocol participants. In other words, protocol participants are able to cast doubt on the evidences of their involvement by lying to
the judge. However, the participants lose the ground for lying when the communication is
recorded verbatim with the help of a third party.
Let’s compare these attacks to one in which an online judge colludes with Bob to frame
Alice during the session by choosing Bob’s ephemeral secret.

1

We can see that an online

judge who colludes with Bob may end up with non-transferable evidence, whereas the previously described online attacks are capable of producing publicly (or selectively) verifiable
and transferable evidence of Alice’s participation in the session. Different computational
assumptions are required to generate evidences with different characteristics (transferable or
publicly verifiable). Understanding these trade-offs may provide us with a more complete
view of online deniability.
Finally, we know that online deniability retains composability property due to the definition in the UC framework [78, 31]. The online deniable protocols satisfying this definition
are resistant to the aforementioned third-party-assisted attacks. When an offline deniable
1

This attack has been introduced in Section A.1.2 of [75], showing that Signal is not
online deniable.
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protocol is combined with arbitrary other protocols, however, offline deniability may not
be preserved. Beside composability, the inclusion of auxiliary information in the definition
of offline deniability requires careful consideration. An example of this situation manifests
itself in the discussion about extractable OWF in Section 4.3. In other words, there are
aspects of the offline deniability definition that must be explored in order to comprehend
the limitations of offline deniability.
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